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Abstract
This paper analyzes how changing the expected length of intellectual property
right (IPR) protection affects growth and the welfare of rich and poor consumers.
The analysis is based on a product-variety model with non-homothetic preferences
and endogenous markups in which, in accordance with empirical evidence, rich
households consume a larger variety of goods than poorer ones. Unlike in models
with homothetic preferences, the effect of intellectual property (IP) protection on
growth depends on the distribution of income: when the length of IP protection is
(uniformly) increased, growth increases when there is inequality among households
consuming IP protected goods, but stays constant when there is no such inequality.
When wealth is unequally distributed, reducing the length of IP protection for
new but not for previously issued IPRs can increase growth. In the case where
increasing the length of IP protection increases growth, poor households prefer
a shorter length of protection than richer ones, although they consume fewer IP
protected goods. (JEL O34, O31, L16, D30, O15)
Keywords: intellectual property rights, income distribution, endogenous growth, non-
homothetic preferences
1 Introduction
With income and wealth inequality on the rise in many developed countries (see for
example Piketty, 2014), distributional concerns are taking center stage in many policy
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debates. When it comes to changes in intellectual property right (IPR) policies like
those included in the recently signed Trans-Pacific Partnership agreement (TPP), it
is therefore important to understand what their distributional consequences are and
whether their effect on innovation and growth depends on the extent of inequality.
While strengthening IP protection can have direct distributive effects by raising the
relative wages of workers performing R&D intensive tasks, this paper studies interac-
tions between inequality, IP protection and the demand for new goods. In standard
product-variety growth models (e.g. Romer, 1990, or Grossman and Helpman, 1992),
the assumption of homothetic preferences implies that the demand for individual goods
and the incentives to innovate do not depend on the distribution of income. The impli-
cation of these models that rich households consume the same variety of goods as poorer
ones and just proportionally more of each good, is, however, at odds with empirical ev-
idence: Jackson (1984) and Falkinger and Zweimüller (1996) find that the variety of
goods consumed increases in household income. Based on data from the US consumer
expenditure survey (CEX), the following graph shows that there is also a positive as-
sociation between a more narrowly defined variety of “innovative” goods consumed by
a household and household expenditures1:
2
4
6
8
10
12
a
ve
ra
ge
 n
um
be
r o
f i
nn
ov
at
ive
 g
oo
ds
 c
on
su
m
ed
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
deciles of total expenditures per household
Innovative Goods Variety by Expenditure Group, 2012
1Out of the over 600 goods from the CEX (INTR), 61 were classified as “innovative”, among them
goods like computer software, video game hardware, portable memory, televisions, photographic equip-
ment and new cars. A complete list of the selected goods is provided in Appendix B1. The number of
“innovative” goods is defined as the number of these selected goods of which a household has bought
at least one unit in 2012. Population weights are those representative for the US population. I thank
Liliya Khabibulina for providing this graph.
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As rich and poor households differ considerably with respect to their consumption
pattern2, it is therefore plausible that the demand for individual “innovative” goods
depends on the distribution of income. Given that firms that invent new goods rely
on IPRs in order to protect their innovations, their profits and incentives to innovate
should therefore depend on both the extent of IP protection and the degree of inequality
across consumers. Moreover, it is likely that an increase in IP protection which leads to
increased markups for some goods affects the consumption of rich and poor households
in different ways.
This paper analyzes how varying the expected length of IP protection affects growth
and the welfare of rich and poor consumers in a general equilibrium product-variety
model with non-homothetic preferences. The analysis is based on Föllmi and Zweimüller
(2006), who analyze the effects of inequality on growth, assuming infinite IP protection.
In order to introduce non-homotheticity in a simple and tractable way, it is assumed
that goods are consumed in discrete amounts and that households are saturated after
consuming one unit of a good3. This implies that, in line with the empirical evidence,
rich households consume a larger variety of goods than poorer ones. Differences in
labor productivities are exogenously given, and there is free entry into R&D. Firms
with IP protection engage in monopoly pricing, while goods are sold at marginal cost
once IP protection has expired. IP protection is assumed to expire stochastically and
the general case is considered in which IP policy can have a differential impact on the
expiration rates of newly and previously granted IPRs. All results are derived taking
transitional dynamics into account.
There are two channels through which the effects that IP protection has on growth
interact with the level of inequality. On the one hand, the extent to which markups
change when the length of IP protection changes depends on the inequality in expen-
ditures across households. On the other hand, changes in the length of IP protection
can lead to changes in the inequality in expenditures (which imply changes in markups)
when they affect the value of initial wealth that is held in the form of non-expired IPRs
and when this wealth is unequally distributed. If the length of IP protection is uniformly
increased for both new and previously granted IPRs, the value of initial wealth remains
unchanged (upon impact), implying that the second channel (“valuation effects”) is shut
2The differences in consumption pattern might be even larger when consumers in rich and poor
countries are compared.
In the CEX data, there is also a positive association between the variety of the remaining “non-
innovative” goods and household expenditures, but no clearcut relation between household expenditures
and the ratio between the variety of innovative and non-innovative goods that a household consumes.
The basic model does not make any predictions about this ratio as it considers the case where all
goods are innovative and only distinguishes between goods that are protected by IPRs and others that
are not (a characteristic on which the CEX provides no information). In footnote 42 and in Section
5 extensions are discussed in which there are also non-innovative goods and in which rich households
consume a larger variety of those goods than poor households.
3An extension with divisible outside goods is discussed in footnote 42.
3
off. Then, a (uniform) increase in the length of IP protection reduces the fraction of
goods that are supplied competitively and at the same time reduces markups on the
increased fraction of monopolistically supplied goods as an increased number of IPR
owners compete for a given “total demand”.
When both rich and poor households consume IP protected goods (“heterogeneous
demand”), a (uniform) increase in the length of IP protection reduces poor households´
consumption and increases the rate of growth. When there is no inequality among
households who can afford to consume IP protected goods (“uniform demand”), a (uni-
form) increase in the length of IP protection, however, does not affect growth as it is
exactly offset by a reduction in markups and per period profits, leaving the incentives
to innovate unchanged. The first main result of the paper is therefore that a (uniform)
increase in the length of IP protection is more likely to increase the rate of growth when
there is inequality among households consuming IP protected goods.
In the case of heterogenous demand, an increase in expenditure inequality leads
to an increase in markups and - as in Föllmi and Zweimüller (2006) - increases the
rate of growth. Due to this mechanism, new feedback effects can emerge when the
length of IP protection is changed in a non-uniform way, as this implies a change in
the value of initial wealth: If the length of IP protection is unexpectedly reduced for
future innovations but not for previously issued IPRs, the value of the latter increases
due to increasing markups. If wealth is unequally distributed, this leads to an increase
in expenditure inequality, which again implies a further increase of markups. In the
case where the distribution of wealth is sufficiently unequal, the latter effect can be
so strong that a reduction in the length of IP protection can actually increase the
rate of growth. All these results differs from those obtained in traditional models with
homothetic preferences, in which markups are constant and in which neither the rate of
growth nor the effects of IP protection on growth depend on the distribution of income.
Given that an increase in the length of IP protection increases growth, it reduces
the variety of goods poor households consume more (in absolute terms) than that
that richer households consume, even though the latter consume a larger variety of
IP protected goods (when demand is heterogenous). The intuition for this surprising
result is the following: while all households consume all of the goods on which IP
protection has expired (as those are the cheapest ones) and are harmed in a similar
way when there are proportionately less of these goods, rich households benefit more
from the decline in markups of IP protected goods, as they consume a larger variety
of these goods. As poor households benefit similarly to richer ones when the rate of
growth increases due to an increase in the length of IP protection4 but suffer from a
4All households have the same discount rate and there are knowledge spillovers due to which an
increase in the number of invented goods increases labor productivities and wages of all households in
a proportional way.
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larger reduction in current consumption, they prefer a shorter duration of IP protection
in this case than richer households do. This is the second main result of the paper.
Even if IP policies do not affect inequality through supply side forces, agreeing on a
uniform (international) length of IP protection might therefore be a difficult task, as
poor households or countries might need to be compensated appropriately in order to
support long IP protection5.
A further result of the paper is that an increase in the discount rate can lead to
an increase in the rate of growth. The reason for this is that the former implies an
increased propensity to consume out of interest income and that it can therefore increase
the inequality in consumption expenditures. As the latter implies larger markups and
profits, the value of an innovation can actually increase even though future profits are
discounted more heavily. Such a “paradox of thrift” does not arise in standard growth
models.6.
In an extension where firms´ price setting power is reduced since households can
also consume traditional, non-innovative goods, it is shown that inequality no longer
needs to be good for growth and that it is more likely bad for growth, the weaker IP
protection is. When markups can be reduced through a reduction in the breadth of
IP protection, it is shown that, holding the rate of growth constant, rich households
prefer long and narrow IP protection, while poor households prefer short and broad
protection.
The paper is structured as follows: In Section 2, the related literature is discussed.
Section 3 describes the model setup and Section 4 analyzes the equilibrium. The main
part of the analysis focuses on the case of two income groups, with Sections 4.2 and 4.3
discussing the case where demand for IP protected goods is heterogeneous and Section
4.4 the case in which demand is uniform. Section 4.6 extends the analysis to the
case where there are many income groups and applies it to an international context.
In Section 5, the extension of a limited price setting power is discussed. Section 6
concludes. Proofs and graphs are collected in Appendix A and supplementary material
in (online) Appendix B.
5In the basic setup of the model, there is no efficient length of IP protection on which all households
agree when transfer payments are permitted. The involved distributional conflict can be substantial:
in the case of two income groups, poor households actually bear the whole costs in terms of reduced
current consumption when the length of IP protection is increased while the consumption of rich
households remains unchanged.
6This result, which is independent of the length of IP protection, has not been derived by Föllmi
and Zweimüller (2006). Their analysis is less general than the one undertaken in this paper as they only
consider the special case in which initial wealth is distributed in the same way as labor endowments
and in which an exogenous change in the distribution of labor endowments is always accompanied by
a corresponding exogenous change in the distribution of wealth. The present paper instead accounts
for the transitional dynamics of the wealth distribution that result from an exogenous change in the
distribution of labor endowments or from changes of other parameters.
While goods are assumed to be symmetric in the present paper, Föllmi and Zweimüller (2006)
analyze the case of more general hierarchical preferences. This extension is discussed in Appendix B5.
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2 Related literature
Cysne and Turchick (2012) study the optimal stochastic IP expiration rate in a lab-
equipment product variety model based on Rivera-Batiz and Romer (1991). Taking
transitional dynamics into account7, they find that growth increases when the (ex-
pected) length of IP protection is increased8. Unlike the present paper, they, however,
do not consider the case where the IP expiration rate can differ for newly and previ-
ously granted IPRs. Cysne and Turchick (2012) find that full IP protection is optimal
if preferences over final goods are logarithmic, but not necessarily if preferences are of
a more general CES type. In this setup, markups are determined by the constant and
exogenously given elasticity of substitution between goods and, unlike in the present
paper, do not depend on the length of IP protection or the distribution of income9.
Chu (2010) studies a quality ladder model with homothetic preferences in which
wealth is unequally and labor incomes are equally distributed. He finds that a (uniform)
increase in patent breadth (modeled as an increase in markups) increases the rate
of growth, g, and the rate of interest, r, and that the latter leads to an increase in
income inequality. Furthermore, he shows that an increase in patent breadth increases
(decreases) consumption inequality if the elasticity of intertemporal substitution, ε, is
smaller (larger) than one. The reason for this is that the increases in g and r lead to
an increase (decrease) in the propensity to consume out of wealth, r− g, if ε < 1 (> 1).
The present paper instead focuses on the case where ε = 1 (logarithmic intertemporal
preferences), in which changes in r and g do not change the inequality in household
expenditures through this channel.
In both Chu (2010) and Cysne and Turchick (2012), the assumption of homothetic
preferences/technologies implies that households with different income levels but equal
ratios of initial wealth to labor income face the same trade-off between growth and
current consumption and would therefore prefer the same level of IP protection (which,
however, the authors do not show)10.
7If patents are instead assumed to be of finite duration, it becomes very difficult to solve for the
transitional dynamics within such models if time is continuous (see Judd (1985) and Cai and Nitta
(2012); Deneckere and Judd (1992) and Matsuyama (1999) study models in which time is discrete and
in which patents last for one period).
8In standard product variety models, increasing the length of IP protection always increases steady
state growth. Exceptions are Furukawa (2007) and Michel and Nyssen (1998) in which growth can be
maximal under finite patent protection as the former assumes that patent protection reduces learning
by doing in the final goods sector and the latter that it prevents other R&D firms from accessing the
patented knowledge.
9Föllmi and Zweimüller (2002) introduce hierarchical preferences into a product-variety growth
model with a representative consumer. They find that markups for patent protected goods rise over
time and that this implies that utility along a balanced growth path is maximal for a finite patent
length.
10In the setup of Chu (2010), it can, moreover, be shown that in the case where ε = 1, all households
would prefer the same patent breadth, independent of their wealth to labor income ratio.
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Saint - Paul (2004) studies a two-period model in which only workers with a suffi-
ciently high level of skills decide to become R&D workers and in which an increase in
IP protection increases the skill premium11. While a reduction in IP protection might
benefit poor unskilled workers (by reducing prices) and harm rich skilled workers (by re-
ducing their wages), Saint-Paul (2004) argues that a social planner would always prefer
to fully enforce IPRs and to address distributional concerns via redistributive taxation.
While Saint - Paul (2004) derives the main results assuming homothetic preferences, he
also shows the following: if a reduction in IP protection leads to a marginal reduction
in the variety of goods that are invented and also in the fraction of monopolistically
supplied goods, then poor households are more likely to benefit from it than richer
ones if the elasticity of utility with respect to consumption increases in the level of
consumption12. This result is, however, derived under the assumption that incomes
and markups are exogenously given.
In Saint-Paul (2006) the utility derived from the consumption of any single good
is bounded from above, implying that, unlike in the case of CES preferences, rich
households value an increase in product variety (through innovation) more than poorer
ones. While Saint - Paul (2006) does not study the role of intellectual property rights,
he shows (in a working paper version, 2002) that a social planner who puts equal weight
on each consumer prefers to allocate fewer resources to R&D than are actually allocated
in equilibrium if patents are infinitely lived.
As all of the above-mentioned papers only analyze cases in which each household
consumes positive quantities of each good, they, unlike the present paper, are at odds
with the empirical evidence indicating that the variety of goods purchased increases in
household income.
Hatipoglu (2012) analyzes the effect of inequality on demand-induced innovations
when patents are of finite length. The theoretical part of his analysis builds on Zweimüller
(2000), who studies a growth model with hierarchical preferences in which markups are
exogenously given. Hatipoglu (2012) finds that redistributing wealth from rich to poor
households can increase demand for patent protected goods and growth by allowing
11Spinesi (2011) and Bernal Uribe (2012) derive similar results in growth models. In Cozzi and Galli
(2014) changes in IP legislation that increase the blocking power of basic research relative to applied
follow-on research can either increase or decrease growth and the skill premium. In a model with
directed technological change, Pan, Zou and Li (2015) find that it is optimal to grant broader patent
breadth to skill-complementary innovations and that this encourages skill-biased technological change
and leads to an increase in wage inequality.
In empirical analyses based on cross country panel data, Adams (2008) and Saini and Mehra (2014)
find that strengthening intellectual property protection has increased income inequality in developing
countries and Saini and Mehra (2014) find that it has reduced income inequality in developed countries.
Using US cross-state panel data, Aghion et al. (2015) find a positive effect of innovation on top income
inequality.
12That means if cu
′(c)
u(c) increases in c, where u(c) denotes the utility derived from a single good (total
utility is additive).
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poor households to overcome a critical income threshold below which they cannot af-
ford to purchase patent protected goods. This effect disappears in the present model
in which markups are endogenous (see footnote 37).
In Kiedaisch (2009), I study a two-period product-variety model with hierarchical
preferences and sector-specific cost-saving innovations. While an increase in IP protec-
tion always increases innovation when profit and labor incomes are equally distributed,
there are two opposing effects when all profit income accrues to a small minority of
rich households: then, stronger IP protection encourages innovation in basic need sec-
tors but - by reducing the purchasing power of mass consumers - reduces demand and
the incentives to innovate in sectors that produce more luxurious goods, implying that
“overall innovation” might be reduced. Unlike in the present paper, markups are con-
stant in Kiedaisch (2009) and, due to the lack of free entry into R&D, an increase in
IP protection increases the rents of firm owners.
Within an international context, several papers have analyzed the effects of having
different levels of IP protection in different countries that interact in a global economy13.
Contrary to this literature, the present paper focuses on the question whether differences
in the structure of demand can lead to disagreement about the optimal uniform global
strength of IP protection.
Furthermore, the paper relates to an extensive literature about the relationship
between inequality and growth and specifically to a few papers in which inequality
affects innovation and growth through the channel of demand14.
3 The model setup
3.1 Preferences and technology
There is a continuum of potentially producible differentiated goods indexed by j ∈
[0,∞). In a given period, only one or zero units of any of these goods can be consumed
by a household i: ci (j, t) ∈ {0, 1}.
13Chung and Lu (2014) analyze the effects of southern IP protection in a two-period North-South
model with hierarchical preferences in which innovators can supply goods of different quality levels.
There is no within-country inequality in this model and, due to the lack of arbitrage, goods are sold
at different prices in the North and the South. Kohler (2012) studies a dynamic North-South trade
model with non-homothetic preferences and full IP protection. He finds that preventing arbitrage
across countries reduces innovation and harms the rich North while it might benefit the poor South.
Chu and Peng (2011) extend the model of Chu (2010) to a two-country context. Further references
can be found in a recent literature survey by Saggi (forthcoming).
14See Murphy et al. (1989), Falkinger (1994), Zweimüller (2000), Mastuyama (2002), Chou and
Talmain (1996), Föllmi and Zweimüller (2006), Föllmi and Zweimüller (forthcoming), Würgler (2010)
and Föllmi, Würgler and Zweimüller (2014) for theoretical contributions. In an empirical study, Beerli
et al (2014) find that changes in the Chinese income distribution led to considerable changes in market
sizes for different durable goods and that productivity increased in sectors in which demand increased.
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Households are infinitely lived and intertemporal utility is given by:
Ui(τ) =
∞ˆ
t=τ
ln
 ∞ˆ
j=0
ci (j, t) dj
 e−ρ(t−τ)dt (1)
where ρ > 0 denotes the rate of time preference. The strong assumption of indivisi-
bilities in the consumption of goods ("0−1 consumption") is made in order to introduce
non-homothetic preferences in a simple and tractable way15.
The factors of production are homogenous labor and the measure N(t) of goods
that have been invented until point in time t (the “stock of knowledge”). Producing
one unit of an invented good requires b
N(t)
≥ 0 units of labor as an input and attaining
an innovation in a sector j is associated with fixed R&D costs equal to F
N(t)
units of
labor. The assumption that labor productivity in both the production and the R&D
sector increases in the stock of knowledge N(t) is made in order to allow for exponential
growth16.
3.2 Intellectual property protection and prices
The labor market is assumed to be competitive and there is free entry into R&D. An
innovator who has invented a good j obtains intellectual property (IP) protection on it,
which allows him to exclude others from producing this good. The intellectual property
right, however, does not allow appropriating any of the spillovers, which increase the
productivity of both firms that produce other goods and of future innovators, implying
that there is a research exemption17. IP protection is assumed to expire with hazard
rate γ (that means with probability γdt in time interval dt), implying that the expected
length of protection is equal to T ≡ 1
γ
. IPRs are therefore infinitely lived (T = ∞) if
γ = 0 and not protected at all (T = 0) if γ →∞18.
15Under certain circumstances, the model might also be interpreted as one in which there is a single
final consumption good of which different quality levels can be consumed: when a higher quality level
can only be produced when a larger variety of inputs j are used in the production process, consuming
a final good of higher quality becomes similar to consuming a larger variety of goods (a high quality
software might for example consist of a low quality version to which new features are added).
16Unlike in standard growth models, the productivity of the production sector needs to increase
in N(t) as the assumption of consumption indivisibilities precludes the possibility to consume and
produce less of each good when the number of goods increases. Only in the special case of a “digital
economy” where b = 0, these spillovers are not required (see footnote 31). If there were no spillovers
in the R&D sector, growth would be linear but the qualitative results would be the same.
17As R&D productivity increases in the stock of knowledge N(t), future innovators benefit from
the R&D undertaken by previous innovators. IP protection could therefore be broadened by granting
innovators some blocking power over future inventions which would enable them to extract licensing
fees from future innovators. In Appendix B3 it is shown that granting such extended IP protection
would reduce the rate of growth along a balanced growth path.
18In the following, T will often simply be referred to as the “length of IP protection”. In the case
of a finite deterministic length of IP protection or infinitely lived IPRs that are only enforced with a
certain probability at the time of invention, the qualitative results stay the same as long as balanced
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After the IPR on a good j has expired, anyone can freely produce this good and it
is supplied at marginal cost due to perfect competition 19. The market clearing wage is
denoted by w(t). In order to obtain constant prices for the competitively supplied goods,
the wage of a productivity-adjusted unit of labor is normalized to one, implying that
the wage for one unit of labor is normalized to w(t) = N(t). Due to this normalization,
the marginal production costs of a good and therefore the price of goods on which IP
protection has expired is given by p(j, t) = b. The fixed R&D costs are also constant
over time and given by F , as R&D labor is competitively supplied. It is assumed that a
firm with IP protection in sector j cannot observe its customers´ income and therefore
cannot price discriminate between households with different willingness to pay.
Households are not financially constrained and can borrow and lend at the interest
rate r(t).
3.3 Distribution
The size of the population and the total labor endowment of the economy are normalized
to 1. While all households have the same utility function, it is assumed that there are
poor (P ) and rich (R) households with population shares β and 1 − β (0 < β < 1)20.
A poor household´s labor endowment is given by lP = ϑ (0 < ϑ ≤ 1) and that of a rich
household by lR = 1−βϑ1−β ≥ 1, as βlP + (1 − β)lR = 1 must hold. For a given ϑ < 1, lR
therefore increases in β. A household´s labor endowment pins down its labor income
as a share of the average labor income in the economy. Inequality in labor incomes is
said to increase if β increases or if ϑ decreases21.
At the initial date t = τ , the economy is endowed with wealth in the form of previ-
ously granted non-expired IPRs, the value of which is equal to the expected discounted
profit income accruing to their owners. A rich household´s initial wealth is denoted by
VR(τ) and that of a poor household by VP (τ), and it is assumed that VR(t) ≥ VP (t) ≥ 0
holds22.
growth paths are compared (see Appendix B4).
19The analysis focuses on intellectual property rights as the only factor granting a monopoly position.
If such a position can be obtained through other factors like trade secrecy, the same analysis applies
to these factors as long as there are the same spillovers and as long as the monopoly position can be
lost due to imitation with hazard rate γ.
20The case of many income groups is analyzed in Section 4.6
21The Gini coefficient is given by G = β (1− ϑ).
22The analysis can be extended to cases where VR(t) < VP (t), where Vi(t) < 0 for one of the groups
(debt), or where ϑ > 1. As long as the distribution of labor endowments and initial wealth is such
that a rich household is overall richer than a poor household and spends more in every period, this
does not change the (qualitative) results.
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3.4 Consumption choices
The intertemporal budget constraint of a household of type i (i ∈ {R,P}) is given by:
∞ˆ
t=τ
N(t)lie
−R(t,τ)dt+ Vi(τ) ≥
∞ˆ
t=τ
 ∞ˆ
j=0
p(j, t)ci (j, t) dj
 e−R(t,τ)dt (2)
where R(t, τ) =
tˆ
s=τ
r(s)ds is the cumulative discount rate between dates τ and t. The
left hand side represents the discounted sum of wage income (note that w(t) = N(t))
plus the value of initial wealth; the right hand side denotes the discounted sum of
consumption expenditures. A household maximizes intertemporal utility (equation 1)
subject to this budget constraint. Setting up the Lagrangian and deriving with respect
to ci(j, t) gives the following first order conditions23:
ci(j, t) =

1 if p(j, t) < e
R(t,τ)−ρ(t−τ)
µiCi(t)
≡ zi(t)
1 or 0 if p(j, t) = zi(t)
0 if p(j, t) > zi(t)
(3)
where Ci(t) =
∞ˆ
j=0
ci (j, t) dj indicates the measure of goods consumed by household
i in period t and zi(t) denotes household i´s willingness to pay for a good. µi is the
Lagrange multiplier and represents the marginal utility of income at the initial date
τ . As goods enter symmetrically into the utility function, households consume all
goods the prices of which lie below their willingness to pay and a nonnegative measure
of goods the prices of which are equal to their willingness to pay. Given that rich
households spend more on consumption in a given period than poor households, they
also consume a larger variety (measure) of goods, i.e. CR(t) > CP (t). In equilibrium,
the intertemporal budget constraints are satisfied with equality and the willingness to
pay of a rich household exceeds that of a poor household, so that zR(t) > zP (t) (and
µR < µP )24.
3.5 Monopoly pricing
A firm that has IP protection on good j sets the price p(j, t) in order to maximize profits.
As zR(t) > zP (t), market demand for any good j in period t is given by a step function
(see Figure 1): for a price higher than the willingness to pay of a rich household
(p(j, t) > zR(t)), there is no demand for the good; for a price equal to or below the
23The second order conditions are satisfied so that there is a maximum
24In an extension that is discussed in Section 5, zR(t) = zP (t) can hold in a particular regime (C3).
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willingness to pay of a rich but above that of a poor household (p(j, t) ∈ (zP (t), zR(t)]),
demand is given by the population size of the rich, 1−β; and for a price below or equal
to the willingness to pay of a poor household (p(j, t) ≤ zP (t)) demand is equal to one
(the size of the whole population)25.
In order to maximize profits, an IP holding firm then either sets p(j, t) = zR(t) and
sells only to rich households (point A in Figure 1) or charges p(j, t) = zP (t) < zR(t)
and sells to both rich and poor households (point B). In the first case, profits are given
by piR(t) = (1− β) (zR(t)− b), and by piP (t) = zP (t) − b in the second case (note
that marginal production costs are equal to b). The firm therefore charges low prices
and sells to the whole population if piP (t) > piR(t), charges high prices and sells only
to rich households if piR(t) > piP (t), and is indifferent between the two strategies if
piP (t) = piR(t).
3.6 Price structure and regimes
The subset of sectors in which IP protection has expired is denoted byM(t) < N(t) and
the definitionm(t) ≡ M(t)
N(t)
is used. While prices are equal to b in these sectors, the prices
in the sectors in which IPRs are protected (of which there is a measure N(t) −M(t))
depend on the distribution of income and other parameters of the model.
Given that rich and poor households spend the amounts ER(t) and EP (t) (< ER(t))
in period t, either CP (t) < CR(t) < N(t) or CP (t) < CR(t) = N(t) holds26. The case
where CP (t) < CR(t) < N(t) can arise if even rich households do not spend enough to
be able to purchase all invented goods, even if they are sold at marginal cost (e.g. if
ER(t) < bN(t)). As households value all goods equally, competition between firms then
implies that no good is sold at a price that exceeds the marginal cost of b in equilibrium.
As even IP holding firms do not earn any profits in this case, there are no incentives
to undertake costly R&D and there cannot be positive growth. The more interesting
case in which IP holding firms earn positive profits arises when ER(t) > bN(t). Then,
CP (t) < CR(t) = N(t) holds, meaning that rich households consume one of each of the
invented goods while poor households just consume the fraction cP (t) ≡ CP (t)N(t) of those
goods (referred to as their “consumption share”). The following analysis focuses on this
case in which two different regimes can emerge:
In Regime A, CP (t) > M(t) (Condition A) so that poor households not only con-
25Here, the cases are considered in which consumers actually buy the good if their willingness to pay
is equal to its price.
26The case where CP (t) = CR(t) = N(t) cannot be an equilibrium for the following reason: If
rich households purchased the same measure of goods as poor households (at the same prices), they
would not exhaust their budgets, implying that their willingness to pay for an additional good, zR(t),
would be infinitely large. Then, some firms would have an incentive to increase their price and to sell
exclusively to rich households, implying that poor households would not purchase one of each of the
invented goods anymore.
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sume goods the IPRs of which have expired but also some more expensive IP protected
goods. Part of the IP protected goods are then exclusively sold to rich households at the
price pR(t) = zR(t) while others are sold to both rich and poor households at the price
pP (t) = zP (t) (> b). As IP holding firms supply symmetric goods, they must be indif-
ferent between both strategies so that piR(t) = (1− β)(pR(t)− b) = piP (t) = (pP (t)− b)
has to hold. This implies that
pP (t) = zP (t) = βb+ (1− β)pR(t) (4)
Firms that sell to both groups therefore charge a price that is lower than the price
pR(t) = zR(t) charged by firms that sell exclusively to rich households.
InRegime B, CP (t) < M(t) (Condition A is violated) holds so that poor households
only consume goods the IPRs of which have expired. This regime arises if EP (t) <
bM(t), i.e. if the spending of a poor household is small relative to the measure M(t)
of competitively supplied goods. As poor households´ willingness to pay is then equal
to marginal cost (zP (t) = b), IP holding firms face a “uniform” demand from rich
households and sell exclusively to them at the price pR(t) = zR(t) (> b).
In the following sections the equilibrium of the dynamic model is derived and the
endogenous variables N(t), M(t), Ei(t), Ci(t), pj(t), pij(t), r(t) and zi(t) are derived as
functions of the exogenous parameters.
4 The general equilibrium
This section studies the general equilibrium of the model. The analysis focuses on
Regime A in which demand for IP protected goods is heterogeneous and where even
poor households purchase some IP protected goods in equilibrium, so that CP (t) > M(t)
(Condition A) holds. Regime B, in which IP holding firms face a uniform demand from
rich households is briefly analyzed in Subsection 4.4.
4.1 The allocation of resources across sectors
In Regimes A and B, the demand for production labor LD in period t is given by
LD(t) =
∞ˆ
j=0
(
b
N(t)
)
[βcP (j, t) + (1− β)cR(j, t)] dj = bβcP (t) + b(1 − β) as bN(t) units of
labor are needed in order to produce one unit of a good and as the population size
of poor (rich) households is given by β (1 − β). The simplification arises as CR(t) =∞ˆ
j=0
cR (j, t) dj = N(t) and as poor households only consume a subset cP (t) ≡ CP (t)N(t) of
the existing goods. The demand LR for R&D workers depends on how much research
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is undertaken, meaning on
•
N(t) = ∂N(t)
∂t
. As the invention of a new product requires
F/N(t) units of labor, the demand for R&D workers is given by: LR(t) = F
•
N(t)
N(t)
=
Fg(t), where g(t) denotes the rate of growth of the stock of knowledge N(t). Equating
supply and demand of labor in a given period yields 1 = LD(t) + LR(t). Plugging
the corresponding values into this equation and solving for g(t) gives the economy’s
resource constraint:
g(t) =
1
F
[1− bβcP (t)− b(1− β)] (5)
Given that b > 0, there is a negative relation between the rate of growth g(t) and
the consumption share of poor households, cp(t). The reason for this is that, as rich
households always consume one of each of the invented goods in equilibrium, employing
more workers in the R&D sector is only possible if fewer workers are used to produce
goods for poor households.27
4.2 Balanced growth
4.2.1 Value of an innovation and interest rate
The expected value of an innovation Z(t) is equal to the expected discounted sum of
profit income that accrues to an IPR holder. Therefore, Z(t) =
∞ˆ
s=t
pi(s)e−R˜(s, t)ds, with
R˜(s, t) =
sˆ
q=t
(r(q) + γ)dq denoting the cumulative discount rate between dates t and s
that depends on both the interest rates and the hazard rate γ at which profits are lost
due to expiring IP protection. Along a balanced growth path (BGP), N(t) and Ci(t)
grow at the constant rate g(t), so that the consumption share cP (t) of poor households
is constant over time. Moreover, per period profits pi(t) = (1−β)(pR(t)−b) = (pP (t)−b)
and the willingness to pay zi(t) = pi(t) are constant. Setting the derivative of zi(t) =
eR(t,τ)−ρ(t−τ)
ci(t)N(t)µi
with respect to time equal to zero gives the Euler equation:
r(t) = ρ+ g(t) (6)
The rate of interest is therefore positively related to the rate of growth and to the
rate of time preference and is constant along a BGP. Along a BGP, the expected value
27This negative relation between g(t) and cp(t) only disappears in the case of a “digital economy”
where marginal production costs are zero (b = 0).
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of an innovation is consequently given by
Z(t) =
pi
r + γ
=
(1− β)(pR − b)
ρ+ g + γ
Due to free entry into R&D, the value of an innovation Z has to be equal to the
(wage) costs of innovating, which are given by F . Therefore, the following free entry
condition needs to hold along a BGP with positive growth:
Z =
(1− β)(pR − b)
ρ+ g + γ
= F (7)
4.2.2 Equilibrium price structure
In the following, the BGP values of m(t) ≡ M(t)
N(t)
and pR are derived.
Multiplying the measure N(t) −M(t) of sectors in which IPRs are protected with
the hazard rate γ with which IP protection expires, the absolute increase in the measure
M(t) of sectors in which IP protection has expired is given by ˙M(t) = γ (N(t)−M(t)).
Taking into account that g(t) = N˙(t)
N(t)
, we can derive m˙(t) = γ (1−m(t)) − m(t)g(t).
Along a BGP, m˙ = 0 needs to hold, so that
m =
γ
g + γ
(8)
Given that cp > m holds (Condition A; Regime A), the BGP consumption expen-
ditures of a poor household in period t are given by
∞ˆ
j=0
p(j, t)cP (j, t) dj = N(t) [mb+ pP (cp −m)]
and those of a rich household by
∞ˆ
j=0
p(j, t)cR (j, t) dj = N(t) [mb+ pP (cP −m) + pR(1− cP )]
While both rich and poor households consume the fraction m of non-IP protected
goods and the fraction cP −m of IP protected goods that are sold at the low price pP ,
only rich households consume the fraction 1− cP of IP protected goods that are sold at
the high price pR. A graphical representation of the equilibrium price and consumption
structure is given in Figure 2. The per period labor income of a poor household is
given by w(t)lP = N(t)ϑ and that of a rich household by w(t)lR = N(t)1−βϑ1−β . Using
the relation N(t) = N(τ)eg(t−τ) and equation (4), the intertemporal budget constraint
of a poor household in period t = τ is therefore given by:
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N(τ)ϑ
r − g + VP (τ) =
N(τ)
r − g [mb+ (bβ + (1− β) pR) (cP −m)] (9)
For a rich household, the intertemporal budget constraint is given by:
N(τ) (1− βϑ)
(r − g) (1− β) + VR(τ) =
N(τ)
r − g [mb+ (bβ + (1− β) pR) (cP −m) + pR (1− cp)] (10)
Multiplying both sides of equations 9 and 10 by r − g = ρ (see equation 6), we obtain
the consumption expenditures in period τ on the right hand sides. Expenditures of a
poor household in any period t = τ are therefore equal to EP (τ) = N(τ)ϑ+ρVP (τ) and
those of a rich household are equal to ER(τ) = N(τ)1−βϑ1−β + ρVR(τ) > EP (τ). Along
the BGP, households therefore spend all their labor income (w(t)li = N(t)li) in each
period and the fraction (r − g)Vi(t) = ρVi(t) of their interest income rVi(t), implying
that expenditures Ei(t) and individual wealth Vi(t) grow at rate g.
As there is a measure N(t) (1−m) of sectors in which IP protection has not yet
expired and as the value of an IP protected innovation is given by Z = F (see (7)), the
total value of initial wealth along a BGP is given by
V (t) = N(t) (1−m)Z = N(t) (1−m)F (11)
When V (t) changes due to a change inm, also VR(t) and VP (t) change. As will be shown
in Section 4.3 which studies the transitional dynamics, these changes in Vi(t) are (in the
baseline case) of equal absolute size28. Because of that, the following parametrization
of the wealth distribution is used:
VR(t) = VP (t) +XN(t) (12)
where X ≥ 0 is an exogenous parameter29. Inserting equation 12 into equation 10,
subtracting equation 9 from equation 10, and solving for pR gives:
pR =
1−ϑ
1−β + ρX
1− cP (13)
28The reason for this is that both rich and poor households consume the same absolute measure
N(t)m of goods on which IP protection has expired and are therefore affected in a similar way when
m changes.
29Using equation 11 and the relation V (t) = βVP (t) + (1− β)VR(t), we can derive the individual
BGP wealth levels as VP (t) = (1−m)FN(t)− (1− β)XN(t) and VR(t) = (1−m)FN(t) + βXN(t).
Because N(t) grows at rate g, both VP (t) and VR(t) grow at rate g along a BGP, so that the relative
wealth distribution stays constant over time along a BGP and reflects the initial distribution of wealth:
VR(t)
VP (t)
= VR(τ)VP (τ) . If m changes due to a change in one of the exogenous parameters, the relative wealth
distribution, however, changes, while the absolute difference in wealth levels is still given by VR(t) −
VP (t) = XN(t). This parametrization of the wealth distribution (i.e. equation 12) differs from the
analysis of Föllmi and Zweimüller (2006), who only study the case where VRVP =
lR
lP
is exogenously given.
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pR therefore increases in cP , β, X and ρ and decreases in ϑ. The mechanism be-
hind these results is the following: the entire expenditure difference ER(t) − EP (t) =
N(t) (lR − lP ) + ρ (VR − VP ) = N(t)
(
1−ϑ
1−β + ρX
)
is used to purchase the measure
N(t) (1− cP ) of IP protected goods that are each sold at price pR. For a given ex-
penditure difference, pR must therefore increase in cP , as rich households spend all
their money on the existing goods. A reduction in ϑ and an increase in β increase the
expenditure difference by increasing the difference in labor income N(t) (lR − lP ), and
an increase in X or ρ increases it by increasing the difference in consumption out of in-
terest income. For cP given, this increased expenditure difference can only be absorbed
if pR increases.
4.2.3 Properties of the BGP
Inserting equation 13 into equation 7 and solving for g, the free entry condition can
be written as:
g =
(
1−ϑ
1−β + ρX
1− cP − b
)
1− β
F
− ρ− γ (14)
The growth rate g depends positively on cP , X and β and negatively on ϑ, γ and F . The
reason for this is the following: an increase in cP , X, and β and a decrease in ϑ increase
the value of an innovation by increasing pR30 and an increase in γ reduces the value
of an innovation by shortening the length of IP protection. An increase in F , on the
other hand increases the costs of innovating. As the value of an innovation decreases
if the interest rate r increases due to an increase in the rate of growth (remember
that r = ρ + g (equation 6)), the free entry condition, which equates the value of
an innovation to the costs of innovating implies a positive relation between g and the
value of an innovation and a negative relation between g and F . The effect of ρ on
g depends on the size of X: For small values of X, the free entry condition implies a
negative relation between g and ρ which is mainly driven by the fact that an increase in
ρ reduces the value of an innovation through a discounting effect. For large values of X,
this discounting effect can, however, be dominated by a positive price effect that results
from an increase in the expenditure difference between rich and poor households: As an
increase in ρ increases the consumption out of interest income ρVi(t), it also increases
the expenditure difference and therefore pR and this effect is stronger the larger X is.
The free entry condition (equation 14) together with the resource constraint (equa-
tion 5) determine the general equilibrium.
30In the case where β increases, this effect is weakened by a reduction in the relevant market size,
1− β. However, the value of an innovation still increases as the first effect is stronger than the second
one.
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Proposition 1. A balanced growth path (BGP) in Regime A exists if 0 ≤ X ≤ X˜ (B),
0 < b < 1
1−β (C), (1− β) ρX−F (ρ+ γ) < ϑ (D), ϑ < (1− β) ρX+ F (ρ+γ)(1−b)bβ + 1−bβ +b
(E), and T ≡ 1
γ
> T˜ (F), with X˜ and T˜ defining positive and finite threshold values.
a) Along the BGP, an increase in the expected length of IP protection T (≡ 1
γ
) is as-
sociated with an increase in the rate of growth g and with a reduction in the consumption
share of poor households, cP .
b) Along the BGP, g depends negatively on ϑ and F and positively on β and X, so
that inequality is good for growth. cP depends positively on ϑ and negatively on X.
c) There is a positive threshold Xˆ < X˜ such that for 0 ≤ X < Xˆ, the BGP value of
g depends negatively (and cP positively) on the discount rate ρ. For Xˆ < X ≤ X˜, an
increase in ρ is associated with an increase in the rate of growth g (paradox of thrift)
and with a decrease in cP .
Proof. See Appendix A1
An increase in T (i.e. a fall in γ) makes research more profitable (for a given interest
rate r = ρ + g) and increases the BGP growth rate. At the same time, it reduces the
consumption share cP of poor households, while rich households always consume one
unit of each good (cR = 1). An increase in T reduces the fraction m of sectors in which
IP protection has expired (see equation 8) and reduces the prices pP and pR at which
IP protected goods are sold in equilibrium. While both rich and poor households are
equally affected by the declines of m and pP , only the rich households benefit from the
reduction in pR which allows them to purchase the same measure of goods as before.
All the additional workers who move into the R&D sector are therefore withdrawn from
sectors that initially produce goods for all households and switch to exclusively serving
rich households once T is increased.
An increase in inequality that results from a reduction in ϑ or from an increase in
β increases the rate of growth. This result is a generalization of the result established
by Föllmi and Zweimüller (2006) who (assuming that γ = 0) only consider the case in
which initial wealth is distributed in the same way as labor endowments (VR
VP
= lR
lp
=
1−βϑ
(1−β)ϑ) and in which an exogenous change in β or ϑ is accompanied by a corresponding
exogenous change in VR
VP
. If the wealth distribution becomes more unequal due to an
increase in X, this increases the rate of growth, as it increases the expenditure difference
between rich and poor households and allows innovators to raise prices31.
The paradox of thrift can arise for the following reason: an increase in the discount
rate ρ increases the consumption out of interest income and, for X > 0, increases
31In the case where b = 0 (“digital economy” with zero marginal production costs), we obtain
g = 1F (see equation 5) and cP = 1− 1−ϑ+ρX(1−β)1−F (ρ+γ) along a BGP. While g is independent of inequality
in this case, cp still depends positively on γ and ϑ and negatively on X. Poor households therefore still
suffer from an increase in the length of IP protection (while rich households are indifferent) although
it does not affect the rate of growth as all labor is inelastically supplied to the R&D sector.
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the expenditure difference between rich and poor households, which allows innovators
to raise prices. If wealth inequality (i.e. X) is large, this effect is stronger than the
standard discounting effect due to which a rise in ρ discourages innovation, so that
an increase in impatience can increase the rate of growth. Due to this mechanism,
there might therefore be considerable growth in unequal economies with low savings
propensities (like the US).
With the total labor income at date t given by N(t) and the total profit income
given by pi (1−m)N(t) = F (ρ+ g + γ)
(
g
g+γ
)
N(t) (equations 14 and 8 are used for
the transformation), the labor income share can be derived as S = g+γ
g+γ+Fg(ρ+g+γ)
. As
∂S
∂γ
> 0 and ∂S
∂g
< 0, an increase in the length of IP protection (i.e. a reduction in γ
which increases g) reduces the BGP value of S.
4.3 Transitional dynamics
Suppose that the economy is on a BGP and that at date t = t0 there is an unexpected
change in one (or several) of the exogenous parameters. An (unexpected) change in the
length of IP protection is parametrized as follows: instead of expiring with hazard rate
γ like before t0, IPRs granted after t0 expire with hazard rate γ1, while IPRs granted
before t0 that have not expired by t0 expire with hazard rate γ0 from t0 onward. Then,
the following proposition holds:
Proposition 2. Suppose that parameters are within the range defined by Proposition 1
so that a BGP in Regime A exists. Then, the transition takes the following form:
a) g and cP (and also r, pR and pP ) immediately jump to their new BGP values in
t0, while m and V adjust sluggishly (when m > 0).
b) If X(t) = VR(t)−VP (t)
N(t)
has the (constant) BGP value Xo before t0, it changes to
X1 =
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g+γ0
Xo (with g indicating the new BGP value) in t0 and stays constant at that
level after t0.
Proof. See Appendix A2.
If γ0 = γ1 so that the length of IP protection is uniformly changed for newly granted
and for existing IPRs in t0, the value of initial wealth does not change in t0. This is
because the fraction 1−m of IP protected goods does not jump in t0 and because the
change in γ is exactly offset by a change in pR, pP , and g due to the free entry condition,
implying that the value of an IPR remains constant at Z = (1−β)(pR−b)
ρ+g+γ
= F . Therefore,
the distribution of initial wealth and X do not change in t0 in this case (unless there is
an exogenous change in X). As g and cp immediately jump to their new BGP values,
the same comparative static results as in Proposition 1 (including the paradox of thrift)
therefore hold if γ0 = γ1 (or if parameters other than γ are changed), even if transition
dynamics are taken into consideration.
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If the length of IP protection is only changed for newly granted IPRs, meaning that
γ1 6= γ0 = γ, the value of initial wealth V and X are multiplied by the factor
(
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g+γ
)
in t0 (see the proof of Proposition 2; g indicates the new BGP value). If γ1 > γ, so that
the length of IP protection is decreased in t0, the value of initial wealth and X therefore
increase. This is because an increase in γ1 goes along with an increase in the prices
pR and pP (and - given that X is not too large - with a fall in g and therefore with
a fall in r), as new innovators could otherwise not break even. Holders of previously
issued IPRs also benefit from this price increase (and potential fall in r) without being
affected by the reduction in the length of IP protection, so that the value of their IPRs
increases. While g and cp still immediately jump to their new BGP values in t0, this
“valuation effect”32 implies that this jump might now differ from the comparative statics
result derived in Proposition 1 in which X was considered to be exogenous. While the
“valuation effect” is negligible for small values of X0 and therefore does not change
the qualitative results of Proposition 1 in this case, the results can change if X0 is
sufficiently large.
Corollary 1. Suppose that Xo = F1−β (rich households own all initial wealth before t0),
ϑ = 1 (no inequality in labor income), b = 1
2
and F = β
2ρ
. If, starting from a BGP
with infinite IP protection (i.e. γ = 0; this BGP exists under the above conditions), the
expected length of protection on new IPRs is slightly and unexpectedly reduced in t0 (so
that γ1 > 0) while IPRs granted before t0 are still infinitely lived (i.e. γ0 = γ = 0), then
the growth rate g increases in t = t0 to its new BGP value (and cP falls).
Proof. See Appendix A3.
The explanation for this result is the following: when the length of IP protection is
reduced for new innovations but not for old ones, the value of initial wealth increases due
to the valuation effect just explained. As initial wealth is very unequally distributed and
as X is large in the case considered in Corollary 1, the absolute increase in X at t = t0 is
also large and implies a considerable increase in the expenditure difference between rich
and poor households. This increase in inequality raises prices and incentives to innovate
more than the reduction in the length of IP protection reduces these incentives, so that
the rate of growth increases in this particular example33.
Proposition 2 also allows the study of the effects of a policy that unexpectedly
“expropriates” owners of IPRs granted before t0 by setting γ0 > γ = γ1 in t0. As the
length of IP protection and therefore prices are unchanged for new innovations, the
32It is assumed that households cannot insure against such policy-induced changes in the value of
their wealth.
33If the policy change was already announced to the households in t−1 < t0, the valuation effect
would already occur in t−1 (but would be weaker the earlier t−1 was relative to t0). In this case, a
reduction in the length of IP protection in t0 might therefore lead to an increase in the rate of growth
in t−1, but not in t0.
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value of IPRs granted before t0 decreases due to a faster rate of expiration γ0. This
leads to a one-time reduction in the value of initial wealth and of X in t0. According to
Propositions 1b and 2b, this reduction of wealth inequality caused by the expropriation
leads to a reduction in the rate of growth in t0.34
4.4 Regime B: uniform demand
In this regime, poor households are so poor that they only consume goods with expired
IPRs. This means that CP (t) < M(t) (cP (t) ≡ CP (t)N(t) < m(t) ≡ M(t)N(t) ) and that IP holding
firms face a “uniform” demand from rich households. A graphical representation of the
equilibrium price and consumption structure is given in Figure 4.
Proposition 3. A BGP in Regime B exists if T ≡ 1
γ
< T˜ =
F(b−ϑ−ρV¯P )
(ϑ+ρV¯P )(1−b(1−β)−β(ϑ+ρV¯P ))
<
∞ (Condition A is violated), ϑ+ρV¯P < b and if 1− b (1− β)−β
(
ϑ+ ρV¯P
)
> 0, where
V¯P ≡ VP (t)N(t) is constant and exogenous.
a) Along the BGP, cP = ϑ+ρV¯Pb and g =
1
F
[
1− b (1− β)− β (ϑ+ ρV¯P )]. Therefore,
g and cP are independent of the expected length of IP protection T (i.e. of γ) and higher
inequality (lower ϑ or V¯P or higher β) is associated with a larger rate of growth.
Suppose that the economy is on a BGP and that at date t = t0 there is an unexpected
change of IP protection or of another exogenous parameter as described in Section 4.3.
Then, the transition takes the following form:
b) g and cP (and also r and pR) immediately jump to their new BGP values while
m, V (total wealth) and VR adjust sluggishly.
c) If V¯P (t) = VP (t)N(t) has the (constant) BGP value V¯
o
P before t0, it changes to V
1
P =
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g+γ0
V¯ oP (with g indicating the new BGP growth rate) in t0 and stays constant at that
level after t0. g therefore increases in t0 if γ1 < γ0, which holds if IP protection is solely
34The intuition for why X stays constant along the transition (i.e. for t > t0) is the following: Given
a change in an exogenous parameter (for example a fall in γ if γ = γ1 = γ0) leads to a fall in m during
the transition, households anticipate that they need to increase their (normalized) expenditures EiN in
the future in order to be able to afford the same consumption shares ci = CiN (cP < cR = 1). The
reason for this is that m is the fraction of non-IP protected goods that are sold at the lowest price b
and that a fall in m implies that proportionally more goods are sold at price pP > b while still the
same fraction 1− cP of goods is supplied at price pR (note that due to Lemma 2 cP and prices pR and
pP are constant during the transition). Households who want to attain constant consumption shares
ci therefore accumulate wealth in the transition phase and the total level of wealth, V = N (1−m)F ,
rises. As both rich and poor households consume the same measure M = mN of cheap non-IP
protected goods, they need to increase expenditures Ei by the same absolute amount, which implies
that they also need to increase their level of wealth Vi (and the resulting interest income from which
they finance the higher future expenditures) by the same absolute amount.
In the case where m rises (for example due to an increase in γ if γ = γ1 = γ0), both rich and
poor households reduce their (normalized) levels of wealth ViN by the same absolute amount as they
anticipate the same absolute fall in future expenditures. Therefore, VR−VPN = X holds during the
whole transition period while VRVP and therefore wealth inequality changes. The effects of γ on g can
therefore not be assessed if two BGPs along which VRVP is the same but γ differs are compared.
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prolonged for newly issued IPRs in t0.
Proof. See Appendix A4.
This regime is therefore more likely to arise the shorter IP protection T is (i.e. the
larger γ is) and the poorer the poor households are (i.e. the lower ϑ and V¯P are; adding
more poor income groups with Ci < M would not change any of the qualitative results).
The rate of growth in Regime B therefore only depends on the length of IP protection
if a change in the latter affects the level of wealth of poor households and therefore the
distribution of income and expenditures. If γ1 < γ0, either because in t0 IP protection
is solely prolonged for new innovations (γ1 < γ = γ0) or because it is reduced for
IPRs issued before t0 (γ1 = γ < γ0, i.e. “expropriation”), the value of initial wealth
held by poor households declines due to the valuation effect described above and their
consumption decreases35. As rich households always purchase one unit of each good,
the total demand for production labor therefore decreases, leaving more labor for R&D
(see equation 5) so that the rate of growth increases.
If γ1 = γ0 or if V¯ oP = 0, there is no valuation effect and a change in the length
of IP protection T neither affects the level of initial wealth of poor households and
their consumption nor growth. This can also be understood by looking at the demand
side: a reduction in T (i.e. an increase in γ1 = γ0) on the one hand reduces the value
of an innovation by reducing the expected time span during which an innovator has
monopoly power, but on the other hand leads to an increase in the price pR and in
per period monopoly profits36. When γ1 = γ0 or V¯ oP = 0, the two effects exactly offset
each other, leaving the incentives to innovate and the rate of growth unchanged. While
a change in T changes the fraction 1 − m of sectors in which IPRs have not expired
and the price pR at which IP protected goods are sold, it does not change the value
of initial wealth held by rich households in t0 if γ1 = γ0 or if V¯ oP = 0. As only rich
households consume IP protected goods in Regime B, such a change in T therefore
merely shifts demand across sectors and time but does not affect “total demand” and
the profitability of R&D. Because of that, firms find it optimal to hire the same amount
of R&D workers as before, leaving the rate of growth unchanged. An increase in the
length of IP protection (i.e. a reduction in γ1 = γ0) therefore only leads to an increase
in growth if it is sufficiently strong to push the economy from Regime B to Regime A37.
35Poor households spend EP (t) = ϑN(t)+ρVP (t) per period and consume the measure CP (t) =
EP (t)
b
of non-IP protected goods that are sold at price b.
36This is different in models with CES preferences, where monopolists always charge the same
markups, independently of m. Deneckere and Judd (1992) and Matsuyama (1999) (who assume CES
preferences and study endogenous innovation cycles) actually focus on the opposite case where the
elasticity of substitution between goods is so high that an increase in the fraction of competitively
supplied goods (m) reduces demand for IP protected goods and (ceteris paribus) the per period profits
of IP holding firms.
37If a marginal change in an exogenous parameter leads to a switch between Regimes B and A, this
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The result that g is independent of γ1 = γ0 also holds in Regime A if there is no
inequality (β = 0 or ϑ = 1). When β and therefore the level of inequality is small,
reducing γ1 = γ0 can only have a small positive effect on g (see equation 5). Prolonging
IP protection (in a uniform way) is therefore more likely to increase the rate of growth
substantially if the distribution of income across households that consume IP protected
goods is sufficiently unequal. This is the first main result of the paper38.
As in Regime A, the labor income share along a BGP is given by S = g+γ
g+γ+Fg(ρ+g+γ)
.
A reduction in the length of IP protection (i.e. an increase in γ) increases S even though
it does not affect g. This is because an increase in γ implies that innovators earn higher
profits (due to higher markups), but for a shorter expected duration T , so that there
is less discounting (note that r is constant when g is constant), implying that a lower
total profit income is needed in order to provide the same innovation incentives.
4.5 Welfare analysis
Taking into account that
∞ˆ
j=0
cR (j, t) dj = CR(t) = N(t) and that
∞ˆ
j=0
cP (j, t) dj =
CP (t) = cPN(t), intertemporal utilities (equation 1) along a balanced growth path
along which the consumption share cp (≡ CP (t)N(t) ) of poor households is constant and
along which N(t) grows at the constant rate g can be derived as:
UR(τ) =
∞ˆ
t=τ
ln (N(t)) e−ρ(t−τ)dt =
ln (N(τ))
ρ
+
g
ρ2
(15)
UP (τ) =
∞ˆ
t=τ
ln (cPN(t)) e
−ρ(t−τ)dt =
ln (N(τ))
ρ
+
ln (cP )
ρ
+
g
ρ2
(16)
does not lead to a discontinuous jump in cP or g, implying that Propositions 2 and 3 cover the whole
admissible parameter range without any discontinuities arising at the switching point. The reason
for this is the following: as firms are indifferent about selling an IP protected good at the high price
pR to only rich consumers or at the lower price pP to both rich and poor consumers, the value of an
innovation and of the level of initial wealth do not change in a discontinuous way if poor consumers can
either afford to purchase a small amount of IP protected goods (Regime A) or no IP protected goods
at all (Regime B). Because of that, there is no discontinuity in the incentives to undertake R&D and
in the equilibrium rate of growth g. This is different in Hatipoglu (2012) where markups are assumed
to be the same, independently of the number of households who purchase a good.
38If there was an intensive margin in addition to the extensive margin of consumption, an increase in
m and an increase in prices of IP protected goods caused by a reduction of T would induce households
to consume less units of each IP protected good and more units of non-IP protected goods. This would
reduce “total demand” for IP protected goods and the incentives to innovate, even if there was no
inequality. This effect would, however, be weaker the faster households get satiated with individual
goods if they consume more of them (with the limit being the case of 0 - 1 consumption analyzed here)
and would probably not change the qualitative result that an increase in the length of IP protection
increases growth more if there is inequality among households consuming IP protected goods.
23
As there are no transitional dynamics for cP and g (see Propositions 2a and 3b), it
suffices to compare intertemporal utilities along balanced growth paths in order to
evaluate welfare effects of different policies.
Proposition 4. a) Rich households benefit from any change in IP (or redistributive)
policy that increases the rate of growth. Poor households benefit from changes in IP
(or redistributive) policies that increase the rate of growth if cP > Fρbβ (case A) and are
harmed by them if cP < Fρbβ (case B). Case B always arises if
Fρ
bβ
> 1. If Fρ
bβ
< 1, Case B
arises under the conditions leading to Regime A if ϑ < Fρ
bβ
(1 + Fγ) + ρX (1− β)− Fγ
and under the conditions leading to Regime B if ϑ < Fρ
β
− ρV P .
b) Suppose that the expected length of IP protection can only be changed in a uniform
way, affecting new and old innovations symmetrically (γ = γ0 = γ1). Then, there is a
non-empty range of parameters for which poor households prefer a finite expected length
of IP protection equal to T ∗P =
1
γ∗P
=
F(1−Fρbβ )
Fρ
bβ
−ϑ+ρX(1−β) < ∞ and for which the economy is
in Regime A. T ∗P decreases in X and ρ and increases in ϑ and in β.
Proof. See Appendix A5.
As rich households always consume one of each of the invented goods (CR(t) =
N(t)), they benefit from any policy that increases the rate of growth (g = N˙(t)
N(t)
) as it
increases their future consumption without affecting their current consumption. For
poor households, there is, however, a trade-off as an increase in T (i.e. a reduction in
γ = γ1 = γ0) or X or a reduction in ϑ on the one hand increases g (dynamic effect)
but on the other hand reduces their consumption share cP (static effect). While poor
households might benefit from growth-enhancing policies if the equilibrium level of cP is
relatively large39, they are harmed by them if cP is relatively low, which can for example
be the case if ϑ is sufficiently low or if X is sufficiently high (or if V¯P is sufficiently low,
when in Regime B).
Given that γ = γ1 = γ0 (so that an increase in T increases g and does not affect
X) and that an equilibrium in Regime A exists in which the length of IP protection
preferred by poor households, T ∗P , is finite, the comparative statics results of Proposition
4b arise for the following reason: the level of cP that optimally trades off static and
dynamic welfare effects and maximizes the intertemporal utility of poor households is
given by cP = c∗P =
Fρ
bβ
and therefore independent of T (i.e. of γ), ϑ and X. Given
that T is set in order to attain this outcome, T ∗P therefore has to decrease in X and
to increase in ϑ as cP decreases in X and T and increases in ϑ (see Propositions 1a
and 1b and Proposition 2). When ρ increases (households get more impatient), current
39Föllmi and Zweimüller (2006) have already shown that poor households can benefit from a regres-
sive transfer which reduces ϑ (they assume that there is at the same time a proportional increase in
wealth inequality).
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consumption becomes more important relative to growth (c∗P increases) and this effect
is so strong that, independently of how ρ affects cP for a given T , poor households
want to reduce T in order to reduce growth. When β increases, c∗P decreases and poor
households prefer a larger rate of growth40. While an increase in β already increases g,
the first effect is so strong that poor households want to increase T in order to increase
g further.
Given that cP < Fρbβ , so that (if γ = γ0 = γ1) poor households want to reduce T
(i.e. to increase γ) while rich households want infinite IP protection (γ = 0), there
is no efficient length of IP protection which can make both groups better off, even if
income or wealth transfers that affect ϑ and X are permitted. The reason for this is
simply that (for β given) rich households can only benefit if g increases, which (due to
the resource constraint) implies that cP has to decrease, making poor households worse
off41. In order to “buy” the support of poor households for longer IP protection, rich
households would therefore have to agree to transfers that increase ϑ or reduce X so
much that the positive growth effect caused by the increase in T would be completely
offset, destroying any welfare gain for rich households42.
Given that cP < Fρbβ , poor households might want to reduce T (i.e. to increase
γ = γ0 = γ1) and to therefore increase m = γg+γ (note that m increases in γ if g declines
in γ) so much that Condition A (cP > m, implying that T > T˜ ) is violated, leading to
40From the resource constraint (equation 5) it can be inferred that the preferred growth rate is given
by g∗P =
1
F [1− bβc∗P − b (1− β)] = 1F [1− Fρ− b (1− β)]. g∗P increases in β for the following reason:
if β increases, a given reduction in cP frees more resources that can then be used for R&D (the benefits
of which accrue to all households due to its public good nature).
41In Appendix B2 it is shown that a social planner who maximizes a weighted sum of intertemporal
utilities and puts welfare weight α > 12 on rich households and welfare weight 1−α on poor households
finds it optimal to set CP (t) < CR(t) = N(t) and to increase g (and to therefore reduce CP and cP )
when α increases given that αFρb(α+β−2αβ) ≥ 1 > (1−α)Fρb(α+β−2αβ) holds.
42This result, however, needs to be qualified. In a previous version of the paper (Kiedaisch, 2009),
a more general setup was studied in which instantaneous utility is given by ui (xi(t), ci (j, t)) =
xi(t)
ν
∞ˆ
j=0
ci (j, t) dj, with xi(t) denoting either the variety or the quantity (assuming divisibility) of
non-innovative, competitively supplied goods that a household consumes (one unit of these goods can
be produces using bx units of labor) and ν ≥ 0 indicating the consumption value of these goods relative
to innovative goods. Within this setup (assuming X = 0 and ν > 0 and considering the regime in
which M(t) < CP (t) < CR(t) = N(t)), xi(t) depends positively on the price of the most expensive
good j that household i consumes (so that xR(t) > xP (t)) and therefore falls when T is larger, i.e.
when there is a larger fraction of IP protected goods sold at lower prices. Unlike in the case where
ν = 0, rich households therefore also suffer from a loss in current consumption (due to a reduction in
xR(t)) when T increases, but still prefer longer IP protection than poor households who suffer from a
reduction in both xP and cP . Given that T is equal to the length of IP protection preferred by poor
households, it is then possible that both poor and rich households benefit from increasing T if rich
households at the same time compensate poor households with transfer payments (that might take
the form of an increase in ϑ). The reason for this is that increasing T reduces the consumption levels
xi(t) of the non-innovative goods (that are inefficiently high when IP protected goods are sold at a
price that exceeds the marginal production costs) and thereby leads to a reallocation of labor from the
production of these goods into the R&D sector, rendering infinite IP protection efficient.
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a switch to Regime B43. As the economy remains in this regime for any T < T˜ , and as
g is independent of T in this regime (assuming γ = γ0 = γ1), poor households are then
indifferent with respect to the exact value of T < T˜ .
4.6 Many income groups
Suppose there are k income groups indexed by i with labor endowments li, initial wealth
Vi and population shares βi (
∑k
i=1 βi = 1). In order to simplify the analysis it is assumed
that households in all income groups have the same (absolute) amount of initial wealth,
so that Vi(t) = V (t). In this case, all households are affected symmetrically when there
is a change in V resulting from an unexpected change in the length of IP protection that
affects newly granted and previously issued IPRs differently (γ0 6= γ1). This implies that
the expenditure differences between households with different incomes are not affected
by valuation effects and that the rate of growth only depends on the hazard rate γ = γ1
with which newly granted IPRs expire, but not on the rate γ0, with which previously
issued IPRs expire.
Groups are ordered by income (labor endowment), so that households in group 1
are the poorest and households in group k the richest (l1 < l2 < ..., < lk−1 < lk). The
size of the population and the total labor endowment are normalized to one (so that∑k
i=1
βili = 1). Households belonging to the richest income group k again consume one
of each of the invented goods along a BGP, so that Ck(t) = N(t) and ck(t) = Ck(t)N(t) = 1.
Households belonging to a poorer group i < k only consume the fraction ci(t) = Ci(t)N(t) of
the goods, with ci(t) increasing in i. IP protected goods are again sold at different prices
which are inversely related to the number of income groups that purchase a particular
good.
Proposition 5. a) Suppose that Vi = V and that a BGP exists in which even the poorest
households consume some IP protected goods, so that c1 > m holds (this requires that
T is sufficiently large). Then, the following holds:
i) An increase (a decrease) in the expected length of IP protection T resulting from
a reduction in γ = γ1 increases (decreases) the rate of growth g and reduces (increases)
the consumption shares ci(t) = Ci(t)N(t) of all households except for those belonging to the
richest group. The poorer a household is, the larger is the absolute reduction (increase)
in ci.
ii) g(t) and ci(t) immediately jump to their new BGP values when T is changed.
iii) The richest households (i = k) always prefer infinite IP protection. Given that
the intertemporal utility of a household belonging to group n (1 < n < k) is maximal
43The threshold level at which this switch occurs and at which cP = m holds is implicitly defined
by T˜ = 1−cP (γ˜)g(γ˜)cP (γ˜) . When T is low (i.e. when γ is high) a BGP in Regime A therefore more likely exists
if parameters are such that the equilibrium values of g and cP are large.
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for a finite expected length of IP protection T ∗n for which a BGP with c1 > m exists,
all poorer households (i < n) benefit from a reduction of T below the level T ∗n and are
harmed by an increase of T above the level T ∗n , while the opposite holds for all richer
households (i > n).
Proof. See Appendix A6.
The intuition for these results44 is the following: when T increases, m falls and prices
pi of IP protected goods fall (pi denotes the price of goods that are still consumed by
households belonging to group i but not by poorer households45). While all households
consume all the M(t) = m(t)N(t) goods on which IP protection has expired and -
taking expenditures as given - suffer from a reduction in m, the effects of the fall in
prices pi affect poor and rich households differently: For a given expenditure difference
(which does not depend on γ if Vi = V ), the consumption difference between a rich
and a poorer household increases as the rich one benefits from a reduction in prices of
a subset of IP protected goods that the poorer one cannot afford to buy. Taking into
account that the fall in pi is so large that it allows households in the richest income
group to continue consuming one of each of the invented goods, this implies that the
reduction in the consumption share (and in Ci) is largest (in absolute terms) for the
poorest households (i = 1) that only benefit from the reduction in p1 but not from the
reduction in any other prices pi with i > 1. Consequently, poorer households are more
likely to benefit from a reduction in T and prefer a shorter duration of IP protection,
while the richest households always prefer IP protection of infinite duration (γ = 0).
This is the second main result of the paper.
Given that γ = γ1 = γ0, so that there are no valuation effects when the length of
IP protection T is changed, no household belonging to income group i ever wants to
reduce T beyond the point wherem starts to exceed the own consumption share ci. The
reason for this is that (absent valuation effects) households with ci < m always benefit
from an increase in T as it increases the rate g with which their wages grow46 without
reducing their own consumption share. The result that poorer households prefer shorter
IP protection therefore only holds for “middle class” households that consume some IP
protected goods, but not for very poor households that do not consume any of these
goods47.
44The following additional result can be derived: if income is redistributed in such a way that
ln+1− ln increases for some i = n and does not decrease for any other i 6= n, g increases (see Appendix
B6).
45A fall in pi therefore only implies that prices of IP protected goods fall conditional on demand, but
not that prices for all IP protected goods fall, as some firms increase prices and sell to less households
when IP protection is increased.
46While a change in T can only affect g through the channel of valuation effects if there is only
one income group that consumes IP protected goods (see Proposition 3), an increase in T (assuming
γ = γ1 = γ0) always increases g if IP protected goods are bought by more than one income group.
47The result that very poor households benefit from an increase in T arises due to the assumption
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4.6.1 Application to an international context
Suppose that the model above describes the world economy and that households belong
to different countries l. This requires the strong assumptions that there are no trade
costs, that spillovers are global and that, due to the possibility of parallel trade, each
good is sold at the same price in each country. Then, the analysis implies that poorer
countries (or countries in which the median voter who is pivotal for policy decisions
is poorer) prefer a (weakly) shorter duration of international IP protection than richer
ones. If countries set their IP policies γl independently, the effective hazard rate of
IP expiration is given by γ =
∑
l γl and the expected duration of IP protection by
T = 1∑
l γl
as, due to the possibility of parallel trade, the price of a good drops to
marginal cost whenever the IPR expires for the first time in one of the countries. If
every country can increase the effective global expiration rate γ by raising γl as much
as it wants, the equilibrium level of T is equal to the shortest one any of the countries
prefers when IP policies are set in a non-cooperative way. Poor countries are then only
willing to voluntarily join an international agreement that sets minimal standards for the
protection of intellectual property rights (like TRIPS or TPP) if they are compensated
appropriately by richer countries who prefer imposing a larger T .
Suppose now that parallel trade between countries is prohibited so that innovators
can set different prices in different countries and can earn profits in a country as long as
the IPR is protected there, independent of whether it has expired in another country.
Given that the richest households in a country are sufficiently rich48, prices are then set
in such a way in this country that these households can afford to consume one of each
of the goods in equilibrium. Poorer households in the same country then just consume
a fraction of the goods. As an increase in the length of IP protection in one country
increases the (global) incentives to undertake R&D and growth, the richest households
in a country who consume all of the goods therefore always prefer infinite IP protection
in their country, while poorer households again face a trade-off between an increase in
the rate of growth and a reduction in their current consumption and might prefer a
shorter duration of IP protection.
that R&D leads to knowledge spillovers that increase the productivity of labor. This assumption was
made in order to allow for balanced growth (see footnote 16) but might not be very realistic. The
result that poorer “middle class” households with ci > m prefer weaker IP protection (i.e. a lower T )
is, however, more robust and also holds in a simple two-period version of the model without spillovers
in which the utility of households with ci < m is independent of the strength of IP protection (which
is parametrized as the probability with which an IPR is enforced. In this setting, there is no initial
wealth and expenditures are equal to labor incomes).
48If these households are so poor that they cannot afford to purchase all existing goods, even if they
are sold at marginal cost, IP holders cannot earn any profits in this country, as competition between
producers of different goods drives their prices down to marginal cost. The extent of IP protection
(γl) in such a country is then irrelevant for economic outcomes.
28
5 Extension: restricted monopoly power
In this section, the basic model is extended by one additional feature: it is assumed that
any good j (j [0;∞)) can be produced using a traditional, inefficient, technology, so
that an innovation merely allows the production a given good j at lower marginal cost
but does not lead to the invention of a new good variety. Producing one unit of a good
using the traditional technology is assumed to require Ω
N(t)
units of labor input, where
Ω > b ≥ 0 holds. It is assumed that traditional technologies are in the public domain
and that they are competitively supplied at the marginal cost of Ω (= w(t) Ω
N(t)
). As
there is an infinite supply of symmetric goods at the price of Ω, a household´s willingness
to pay for a single good j never exceeds Ω, so that zP (t) ≤ zR(t) ≤ Ω must hold49. The
presence of the traditional technology therefore prevents IP holding innovators from
charging a price in excess of Ω. When Ω is large, this restriction is never binding, as
IP holding firms find it optimal to charge a price that lies below Ω. Then, the analysis
is the same as in the main part of the paper. If the traditional technologies are more
efficient, i.e. if Ω is lower, IP holding firms might, however, be constrained in their price
setting power and the following new “constrained” regimes can arise50:
C1): CP (t) < N(t) < CR(t), C2): CP (t) = N(t) < CR(t) and C3): N(t) < CP (t) <
CR(t).
In the following, the main insights obtained from studying these regimes are briefly
summarized. The formal derivations are provided in Appendix B7. The focus of the
analysis lies on Regime C1 in which, in line with the empirical evidence, poorer house-
holds purchase a smaller variety of “innovative goods” than richer households do.
5.1 Regime C1: limit pricing
In this regime, rich households consume some traditionally produced goods and some
exclusively sold IP protected goods at the limit price Ω. Considering the case where
M(t) < CP (t), part of the IP protected goods are sold to both income groups at
price pP (t) = zP (t) = βb + (1 − β)Ω (see Figure 5 for a graphical representation).
A uniform increase in T (i.e. a decline in γ = γ1 = γ0) increases g and, unlike in
regimes A and B in which markups depend negatively on T , reduces CP and CR by the
same absolute amount. While rich households always prefer infinite IP protection, poor
households prefer a finite length of protection (T ∗P <∞) if inequality is sufficiently large
(and infinite protection otherwise). The reason for this is that intertemporal utility is
concave in Ci and linear in g, making poorer households (with a lower C) more willing
49The traditionally produced goods might also be interpreted as home-produced goods or as leisure
time.
50Bertola, Föllmi and Zweimüller (2006, Section 11.2.2) study a similar setup assuming infinite IP
protection (γ = 0).
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to give up on growth in order to increase current consumption51
5.1.1 Length vs breadth of IP protection
Suppose now that policymakers can restrict the maximal price that IP holding firms can
charge to a level p¯ < Ω. This might be done by reducing the breadth of IP protection
by allowing entrants to supply inferior imitations of IP protected goods as long as their
marginal production costs do not lie below p¯. A lower breadth of IP protection then
forces IP holders who sell exclusively to rich households to charge a lower limit price p¯
in order to prevent entry. Alternatively, antitrust authorities might directly impose a
price cap p¯. 52
Then, rich households prefer long (large T and low γ) and narrow (low p¯)
IPRs while poor households prefer short (low T and high γ) and broad (high p)
IPRs in order to provide innovation incentives that lead to a given rate of growth. The
intuition behind this result is the following: an increase in T reduces m and thereby
reduces both cP and cR by the same absolute amount, as households in both income
groups consume all of the goods on which IP protection has expired (note that prices of
IP protected goods do not depend on T in this regime). Contrary to that, an increase in
p¯ reduces cR more than cP , as it implies that rich households not only have to pay higher
prices for the IP protected goods that are purchased by all households, but also for the
IP protected goods that they consume exclusively. Consequently, rich households prefer
increasing IP protection by increasing T , while poor households prefer to increase it by
increasing p, shifting the burden towards rich consumers.
5.2 The effect of IP protection on the relation between inequal-
ity and growth
In Regime C2 (see Figure 6), the length of IP protection T has no effect on g when
γ1 = γ0, as it (like in Regime B) leaves “total demand” unaffected and merely shifts
the uniform demand across sectors and time. In Regime C3 (see Figure 7), increasing
T increases g and reduces cP and cR by the same absolute amount, and both rich and
poor households always benefit from an increase in T .
The effect that inequality has on growth differs in the three regimes: in Regime C1,
g depends negatively on β and does not depend on ϑ and X; in Regime C2, g depends
51This does not happen in models with CES preferences where (unlike in Saint - Paul (2006)) rich
and poor households face the same trade-off between growth and current consumption and where an
increase in the fraction of monopolistic firms (i.e. a reduction in m) reduces current consumption of
all households proportionally as the amount of each good that a household consumes is proportional
to household expenditures.
52Another reason for a price restriction might be that IP holders are forced to license their innovation
to competitors at the fixed per unit royalty rate p¯.
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positively on ϑ and negatively on X (inequality is bad for growth) and in Regime C3,
inequality has no effect on growth.
Suppose that parameters are such that Condition A (CP > M) always holds and
that the economy is in Regime A (in which inequality is good for growth) for high values
of T . Then, a reduction in T (starting from T = ∞) first leads to a shift to Regime
C1, then to a shift to Regime C2, and finally to a shift to Regime C3. Therefore, a
reduction in the length of IP protection makes it less likely that inequality is good for
growth. The same holds true for a reduction in patent breadth. The intuition behind
this result is that a reduction in IP protection makes it more likely that firms become
constrained in their price setting power and that the incentives to innovate primarily
depend on the size of the market (which tends to be larger when inequality is lower)
and not on individual households´ willingness to pay in this case.
6 Conclusion
This paper has studied the effects that increasing the (expected) length of intellectual
property protection has on inequality and growth in a model in which, in accordance
with empirical evidence, rich households consume a larger variety of goods than poorer
ones.
The first main result of the analysis is that, unlike in models with homothetic
preferences, the effects that IP protection has on growth depend on the distribution
of income. While a (uniform) increase in the length of IP protection increases growth
when there is inequality among households consuming IP protected goods, it does not
when there is no such inequality. Moreover, an unexpected decline in the length of IP
protection for new, but not for previously issued IPRs can increase growth by increasing
inequality.
The second main result is that poor households who consume fewer IP protected
goods than richer ones prefer a shorter length of IP protection than richer ones if in-
creasing the length of IP protection increases growth. This is because richer households
benefit more from a fall in markups of IP protected goods when the length of IP pro-
tection is increased while all households are harmed in a similar way from the resulting
reduction in the number of competitively supplied goods. While the existing literature
has focused on channels through which increased IP protection can increase income
inequality by increasing the skill premium or the rate of return on assets, this paper
therefore identifies a new channel through which it can increase consumption inequality.
When firms´ price setting power is restricted, it is, moreover, shown that rich (poor)
households prefer long and narrow (short and broad) IP protection and that an increase
in inequality is more likely to be good for growth the stronger IP protection is.
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While it might in many cases be more efficient to address distributional concerns
by using taxes and transfers and not by changing IP legislation, this analysis has iden-
tified several new mechanisms, the understanding of which might help design policies
conductive to equitable growth.
In order to simplify the analysis, it was assumed that households either consume zero
or one units of any given good, implying that they do not consume a larger quantity of
a good when its price decreases due to an expiration of IP protection. While the consid-
erable differences in the varieties of goods purchased by rich and poor households found
in the data indicate that households do quickly become satiated with individual goods
and/or that consumption indivisibilities are important, it would clearly be interesting
to make the model more realistic by allowing for intensive margins of consumption53.
Moreover, the model could be extended to allow for (cumulative) quality-increasing or
cost-reducing innovations which are clearly important in the real world. These exten-
sions are left for future research.
53In a previous version of the paper (Kiedaisch, 2009), I have studied a more general setup in
which households can consume a homogenous (divisible) outside goods in addition to the non-divisible
innovative goods. Some of the effects that arise in this setup are likely to also arise in a more general
setup with intensive consumption margins for all goods (for a brief description of these effects, see
footnotes 42 and the discussion of Proposition 8 in Appendix B7).
32
Appendix A
A1 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof. In the following, the shapes of the free entry (FE, equation 14) and the resource
constraint (RC, equation 5) curves are analyzed in g - cP space (with the latter variable
on the horizontal axis) and the comparative static results are derived. A graphical
representation is given in Figure 3.
The RC curve is continuous, linear and downward sloping if b > 0 (Condition C)
and crosses the g - axis at gRC(cP = 0) = 1−b(1−β)F and the cP - axis at c
RC
P (g = 0) =
1−b(1−β)
bβ
54. b < 1
1−β (Condition C) therefore needs to hold in order to ensure that
g > 0 and cP > 0 can hold. For cP < 1, the FE curve is continuous and upward
sloping. It crosses the cP - axis at cFEP (g = 0) = 1− 1−ϑ+(1−β)ρXF (ρ+γ)+(1−β)b < 1 and the g - axis
at gFE(cP = 0) =
(
1−ϑ+(1−β)(ρX−b)
F
)
− ρ − γ and approaches the asymptote cP = 1
( lim
g→∞
cFEP = 1). Therefore, cP < 1 always holds. Given Condition C holds, the two
curves cross in the positive quadrant if gFE(cP = 0) < gRC(cP = 0) (D) and if cFEP (g =
0) < cRCP (g = 0) (E). These conditions are satisfied if ϑ > (1− β) ρX − F (ρ+ γ)
(D) and if ϑ < (1− β) ρX + F (ρ+γ)(1−b)
bβ
+ 1−b
β
+ b (E) hold. In order to ensure that
VP (t) = (1−m)FN(t)− (1− β)XN(t) ≥ 0 (see footnote 29 for the derivation of VP ),
X ≤ X˜ ≡ (1−m)F
1−β (Condition B) needs to be satisfied, where X˜ > 0 as m =
γ
g+γ
< 1
must hold along any BGP with positive growth. In order to obtain a BGP in Regime A,
Condition A (cP > m) has to hold. For any fixed value of g > 0, m = γg+γ continuously
increases from 0 to 1 if γ increases from 0 to ∞. As Condition D implies that cP > 0
holds (even if γ = 0), there is always a positive threshold γ˜ (or a finite threshold T˜ = 1
γ˜
),
such that for 0 ≤ γ < γ˜ (or T˜ < T ≤ ∞; Condition F), cP > m holds along the BGP.
The comparative static results a), b), and c) can be derived by analyzing how a
change in an exogenous parameter shifts the RC and the FE curves: an increase in
γ (i.e. a reduction in T ) or ϑ and a decrease in X shift the FE curve downwards
and leave the RC unaffected, implying a reduction in g and an increase in cP . An
increase in F and a reduction in β shift both the RC and the FE curves downward
and lead to a reduction in g. Deriving the FE condition (14) with respect to ρ gives
∂g
∂ρ
∣∣∣
FE
= X(1−β)
F (1−cP ) − 1. Therefore,
∂g
∂ρ
∣∣∣
FE
> 0 holds if X > (1−cP )F
1−β ≡ Xˆ > 0. This
condition is compatible with Condition B (X ≤ (1−m)F
1−β ≡ X˜) due to Condition A
(cP > m). Therefore, an increase in ρ shifts the FE curve upward if Xˆ < X ≤ X˜,
while it shifts it downward if 0 ≤ X < Xˆ. As the RC curve does not depend on X,
the BGP growth rate g therefore increases in ρ if Xˆ < X ≤ X˜ and decreases in ρ if
0 ≤ X < Xˆ.
54The notation xy(z = k) indicates the value x given by equation (curve) y if z has value k.
33
A2 Proof of Proposition 2
Proof. In the following it is shown that all equilibrium conditions are satisfied if g and
cP , r, pR and pP immediately jump to their new BGP values and if X immediately
jumps from X0 to X1 when an unexpected change in IP policy or in one of the other
exogenous parameters occurs in t = t0. The following notation is used: old BGP values
are labeled with the subscript o while new BGP values are not labeled.
As neither the resource constraint (equation 5) nor the free entry condition (equation
14 with X replaced by X1 = ρ+g+γ1ρ+g+γ0Xo) directly depends on the sluggishly adjusting
state variables V and m, it suffices to show that the intertemporal budget constraints,
in which both V and m enter, are still fulfilled with equality if g, cP , r, pR, pP , and
X immediately jump to their new BGP values while m and V adjust slowly. As pR
(equation 13) is derived by subtracting the budget constraint of a poor household from
that of a rich household, the latter is always satisfied if pR is constant, so that it
suffices to check only whether the budget constraint of a poor household is satisfied
with equality.
At point in time t = t0, the number of competitively supplied goods is given by the
old BGP value M(t0) = moN(t0). When prices immediately jump to their new BGP
value in t0, pR can be derived as
pR =
F (ρ+ g + γ1)
1− β + b
from the free entry condition (equation 7) that is forward looking and satisfied at each
instant of time. Taking into account that the stock of existing IPRs expires at rate γ0
after t0, so that the value of one of these IPRs is given by Zo = (1−β)(pR−b)ρ+g+γ0 = F
(
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g+γ0
)
,
the total value of initial wealth at point in time t = t0 is given by
V (t0) = N(t0) (1−mo)Zo = N(t0) (1−mo)F
(
ρ+ g + γ1
ρ+ g + γ0
)
If γ1 = γ2, the value of initial wealth therefore does not change in t0, even if the length
of IP protection is changed (i.e. if γ 6= γ1 = γ2). The initial wealth of a poor household
can be (as in footnote 29) derived as
VP (t0) = N(t0)
(
ρ+ g + γ1
ρ+ g + γ0
)
[(1−mo)F − (1− β)Xo]
Inserting this expression and equation 4 into equation 9 and replacing N(t0)m
r−g with´∞
t=t0
M(t)e−(ρ+g)(t−t0)dt to account for the fact that m(t) changes during the transition,
the intertemporal budget constraint of a poor household at point in time t0 can be
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written as
N (t0)
pP − b
[
pP cP − ϑ
ρ
+
(
ρ+ g + γ1
ρ+ g + γ0
)
[(1− β)Xo − (1−mo)F ]
]
=
ˆ ∞
t=t0
M(t)e−(ρ+g)(t−t0)dt
(17)
In order to replace the integral on the right hand side, M(t) has to be determined.
Defining the stocks of IPRs granted before and after t0 by P 0(t) and P 1(t), the
differential equation
∂M(t)
∂t
= γ0P
0(t) + γ1P
1(t)
determines the evolution of M(t) for t > t0 as the measure M(t) of competitively
supplied goods increases due to the expiration of both stocks of IPRs. As ∂P
0(t)
∂t
=
−γ0P 0(t) and as P 0(t0) = N(t0)(1−mo), P 0(t) is given by
P 0(t) = N(t0)(1−mo)e−γ0(t−t0)
From the differential equation ∂P
1(t)
∂t
= ∂N(t)
∂t
− γ1P 1(t) = gN(t) − γ1P 1(t) and the
initial condition P 1(t0) = 0, the evolution of the stock P 1(t) of IPRs granted after t0
can be derived as
P 1(t) =
gN(t0)
g + γ1
[
eg(t−t0) − e−γ1(t−t0)]
Therefore,
∂M(t)
∂t
= γ0P
0(t)+γ1P
1(t) = γ0N(t0)(1−mo)e−γ0(t−t0) +γ1 gN(t0)
g + γ1
[
eg(t−t0) − e−γ1(t−t0)]
Taking into account that M(t0) = N(t0)mo, we can derive
M(t) = N(t0)
[
γ1
g + γ1
eg(t−t0) +
g
g + γ1
e−γ1(t−t0) − (1−mo) e−γ0(t−t0)
]
so that
ˆ ∞
t=t0
M(t)e−(ρ+g)(t−t0)dt = N(t0)
[
γ1
(g + γ1) ρ
+
g
(g + γ1) (ρ+ g + γ1)
− 1−mo
ρ+ g + γ0
]
(18)
Inserting this, pP = F (ρ+ g + γ1) + b (derived from equations 4 and 7 with γ replaced
by γ1) and cP = 1bβ (1− gF − b (1− β)) (from equation 5) into equation 17 gives the
following cubic equation that determines g
−g3F 2+g2F [1 + bβ − 2b− F (2ρ+ γ0 + γ1)]+gb [1− ϑβ − b (1− β) + β (1− β)Xoρ] +
gF [2ρ+ γ0 + γ1 − F (ρ+ γ0) (ρ+ γ1)− b (ρ (3− β) + γ0 (2− β) + γ1)] +
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(ρ+ γ0) [F (ρ+ γ1) (1− b)− b (ϑβ − 1 + b (1− β))] + bβ (1− β)Xoρ (ρ+ γ1) = 0
This equation is independent of mo and the same as that that results when the new
BGP value of g is determined by inserting the free entry condition (equation 14, with
Xo replaced by X1 = ρ+g+γ1ρ+g+γ0Xo) into the resource constraint (equation 5). Therefore,
the intertemporal budget constraint of a poor household is satisfied with equality if g,
cP , r, pR, pP and X immediate jump to the new BGP values in t0 while m (and V )
adjust sluggishly.
A3 Proof of Corollary 1
Proof. While the resource constraint is always given by equation 5, the free entry con-
dition is given by
go =
(
1−ϑ
1−β + ρXo
1− coP
− b
)
1− β
F
− ρ
before t0 and by
g =
 1−ϑ1−β + ρ
(
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g
)
Xo
1− cP − b
 1− β
F
− ρ− γ1
after t0 (see equation 14 and Proposition 2b with γ0 = 0). The new BGP value g
therefore lies above the old one go if the new free entry curve lies above the old one (i.e.
if for given value of cp, the value of g is larger in the new FE condition). This is the
case if
X0 >
F (1− cP ) (ρ+ g)
(1− β) ρ
holds for both the old and the new BGP values of g and cP . Inserting the maximal
value Xo = F1−β for which V
o
P = 0 (see footnote 29 with m = 0; this coincides with
the case where X = X˜ in Proposition 1, implying that Condition B is satisfied with
equality), this condition becomes
cP > 1− ρ
ρ+ g
(Condition G). As only a marginal increase in γ1 is analyzed and as the new FE
condition coincides with the old one for γ1 = 0, it suffices to show that Condition G is
satisfied for the old BGP values go and cop. Inserting the resource constraint (equation
5) into the free entry condition gives a quadratic equation with the interior solution
coP =
1 + bβ + Fρ−
√
(1 + bβ + Fρ)2 − 4bβϑ
2bβ
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Inserting this into the resource constraint gives
go =
1
2F
[
1 + bβ − 2b− Fρ+
√
(1 + bβ + Fρ)2 − 4bβϑ
]
Inserting these values into Condition G leads to the inequality√
(1 + bβ + Fρ)2 − 4bβϑ
(
1
β
− 1
)
−
[
1 + bβ + Fρ
β
+ 1 + bβ − 2b− ρF − 2ϑ
]
> 0
If ϑ = 1, b = 1
2
and F = β
2ρ
, this inequality is satisfied and an interior solution
(0 < coP < 1 and go > 0) is obtained. Therefore, g increases in t0 in this case55.
A4: Proof of Proposition 3
Proof. a): As the prices of the competitively supplied goods are equal to the marginal
cost b, the expenditures EP (t) of a poor household that only purchases these kind
of goods are equal to YP (t) = bCP (t) in period t. Along a BGP on which CP (t)
(= cP (t)N(t)) and the labor income ϑN(t) of a poor household grow at rate g, the
intertemporal budget constraint of such a household can (like in equation 9) be derived
as
N(τ)ϑ
r − g + VP (τ) =
N(τ)
r − g cP b
Taking into consideration that r = ρ+ g (equation 6) holds along a BGP and using
the definition V¯P ≡ VP (τ)N(τ) gives
cP =
ϑ+ ρV¯P
b
(19)
In order to obtain an interior solution cP < 1, ϑ + ρV¯P < b has to hold. Inserting
equation 19 into the resource constraint (equation 5) allows the derivation of the BGP
growth rate as
g =
1
F
[
1− b (1− β)− β (ϑ+ ρV¯P )] (20)
In order for a BGP with g > 0 to exist, 1−b (1− β)−β (ϑ+ ρV¯P ) > 0 therefore has
55During the transition period, m increases and the normalized value of wealth V (t)N(t) decreases. As X
is constant during the transition (see the proof of Proposition 2), this implies that the value of initial
wealth of a poor household, VP (t) = V (t)− (1− β)XN(t), falls below zero in the long run because it
is equal to zero at t0. In the example analyzed in Corollary 1, poor households therefore end up with
a small amount of debt in the long run (VP < 0), a feature that was excluded by assumption in the
previous analysis. The qualitative result of Corollary 1 does, however, not depend on this feature: As
the relation between X, g and cP is continuous and as only a marginal reduction in the length of IP
protection is analyzed (γ1 is small), the qualitative result of Corollary 1 can still be obtained in cases
where poor households start with a slightly positive amount of initial wealth (i.e. if Xo = F1−β −  with
 small) and never accumulate debt so that VP > 0 always holds.
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to hold. Moreover, cP < m needs to hold in Regime B (Condition A must be violated).
Inserting equation 19 and m = γ
g+γ
(which can again be derived like in equation 8) with
g replaced by its BGP value into this condition and solving the resulting inequality
for γ gives the inequality γ > (
ϑ+ρV¯P )(1−b(1−β)−β(ϑ+ρV¯P ))
F(b−ϑ−ρV¯P )
under which Condition A is
violated. Given that g > 0 and cP < 1, both the numerator and the denominator of
the right hand side of this inequality are positive, so that γ > 0 has to hold. Condition
A is consequently violated if T ≡ 1
γ
< T˜ =
F(b−ϑ−ρV¯P )
(ϑ+ρV¯P )(1−b(1−β)−β(ϑ+ρV¯P ))
<∞ holds.
b) and c): As in the proof of Proposition 2 it is now shown that all equilibrium
conditions are satisfied if g, cP , r and pR immediately jump to their new BGP values
and if V¯P immediately jumps from V¯ oP to V¯ 1P when an unexpected change in IP policy
or in one of the other exogenous parameters occurs in t = t0. Old BGP values are again
labeled with the subscript o while new BGP values are not labeled.
As poor households do not consume IP protected goods and are therefore not con-
fronted with changing consumption prices, they spend all their labor income ϑN(t) and
in addition the amount (r − g) V¯PN(t) = ρV¯PN(t) every period, implying that VP (t)
grows at rate g and that V¯P is constant after t0. What remains to be shown is that
the intertemporal budget constraint of a rich household is satisfied with equality if the
transition of m is taken into account.
When prices immediately jump to their new BGP value in t0, equation 7 can be
used to derive pR (the price at which IP protected goods are sold to rich households)
as:
pR =
F (ρ+ g + γ1)
1− β + b
As the stock of existing IPRs expires at rate γ0 after t0, so that the value of one of
these IPRs is given by Zo = (1−β)(pR−b)ρ+g+γ0 = F
(
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g+γ0
)
, the total value of initial wealth
at point in time t = t0 is given by
V (t0) = N(t0) (1−mo)Zo = N(t0) (1−mo)F
(
ρ+ g + γ1
ρ+ g + γ0
)
The initial wealth of a poor household therefore changes from V¯ oP to V¯ 1P =
(
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g+γ0
)
V¯ oP
in t0. As V = βVP + (1− β)VR and as V¯ oP = V
o
P
N
, the stock of initial wealth held by a
rich household in t0 can be derived as
VR(t0) =
N(t0)
1− β
[
ρ+ g + γ1
ρ+ g + γ0
] (
(1−mo)F − βV¯ oP
)
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The intertemporal budget constraint of a rich household is given by
N(t0)
(r − g)
(1− βϑ)
(1− β) + VR(t0) =
∞ˆ
t=t0
[M(t)b+ (N(t)−M(t))pR] e−r(t−t0)dt
as rich households buy the measure M(t) of competitively supplied goods sold at price
b and the measure N(t) − M(t) of IP protected goods sold at price pR in period t.
Replacing r, pR, and VR(t0), this budget constraint can be written as
N(t0)
[
1
ρ
− 1− βϑ− b (1− β)
Fρ (ρ+ g + γ1)
− (1−mo)F − βV¯
o
P
F (ρ+ g + γ0)
]
=
∞ˆ
t=t0
M(t)e−r(t−t0)dt
Replacing the right hand side by equation 18 that has been derived in the proof of
Proposition 2, the budget constraint can be rewritten as:
g =
1
F
[
1− b (1− β)− βϑ− βρV¯ oP
(
ρ+ g + γ1
ρ+ g + γ0
)]
As this is the same equation as equation 20 with V¯P replaced by V¯ 1P = V¯ oP
(
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g+γ0
)
, the
intertemporal budget constraints of rich households are satisfied with equality when g,
cP , pR, r and V¯P immediately jump to their new BGP values while m and VR(t)N(t) adjust
sluggishly.
A5: Proof of Proposition 4
Proof. a) Rich households benefit from any policy that increases g as UR(τ) increases
in g (see equation 15). Inserting equation 5 (which holds in both regimes) into equation
16 gives UP (τ) as a continuous and concave function of cP . As UP (τ) is maximal for
cP =
Fρ
bβ
, poor households benefit from policies that reduce cP and therefore (taking
equation 5 into account) increase g if cP > Fρbβ and are harmed by them if cP <
Fρ
bβ
. As
cP < 1, poor households therefore always want to reduce g if Fρbβ > 1 (there is a non-
empty range of parameters for which this condition is compatible with the existence of
a BGP in both Regime A and B).
In Regime B, cP = ϑ+ρV¯Pb <
Fρ
bβ
holds if ϑ < Fρ
β
− ρV P and there is a non-empty
range of parameters for which a BGP exists and for which this condition in addition to
the condition Fρ
bβ
< 1 is satisfied. In Regime A, cP can be derived from equations 5 and
14 as
cP =
1 + Fρ+ bβ −
√
(1 + Fρ+ bβ)2 − 4bβ (Fρ+ ϑ− ρX (1− β))
2bβ
(21)
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If Fρ
bβ
< 1, cP < Fρbβ requires that ϑ <
Fρ
bβ
(1 + Fγ) + ρX (1− β)− Fγ holds in addition
to the other existence conditions from Proposition 1. (there is a non-empty range of
parameters that fulfills all conditions).
b) Assuming that Fρ
bβ
< 1, cP = Fρbβ holds if γ =
Fρ
bβ
−ϑ+ρX(1−β)
F(1−Fρbβ )
= γ∗P , i.e. if T ∗P =
1
γ∗P
=
F(1−Fρbβ )
Fρ
bβ
−ϑ+ρX(1−β) , so that poor households prefer T to be set equal to this value if it is
compatible with the existence of a BGP in Regime A. For the welfare analysis it suffices
to compare BGP values holding X constant (see Proposition 2b with γ = γ1 = γ0).
It is now shown that there are parameter constellations for which 0 < γ∗P < γ˜, i.e.
T˜ < T ∗P < ∞ is an interior solution in Regime A: Suppose that γ∗P is only slightly
positive. Then, Condition D from Proposition 3reduces to (1− β) ρX − Fρ < ϑ and
Condition E to ϑ < (1− β) ρX+ Fρ(1−b)
bβ
+ 1−b
β
+b (the parameter range defined by these
two conditions is nonempty under Condition C). γ∗P is positive if ϑ <
Fρ
bβ
+ ρX (1− β)
and if Fρ
bβ
< 1 and there is a non-empty range of parameters for which all of the above
conditions are satisfied. When γ∗P is small, m =
γ
g+γ
(see equation 8) is close to zero
if g > 0, so that cP > m (Condition A) and therefore γ < γ˜ (Condition F) holds if
cP > 0. The latter is always satisfied as the term (Fρ+ ϑ− ρX (1− β)) that appears
under the square root in equation 21 is positive due to Condition E. Therefore, an
interior solution exists under these conditions.
Deriving T ∗P with respect to the different parameters gives
∂T ∗P
∂ϑ
> 0, ∂T
∗
P
∂ρ
< 0,
∂T ∗P
∂X
< 0 and sign
(
∂T ∗P
∂β
)
= sign (F (1− ϑ) +X (bβ2 + Fρ (1− 2β))) > 0, where the
last inequality holds due to the fact that Fρ
bβ
< 1 and therefore bβ > Fρ needs to be
satisfied in order to obtain an interior solution.
A6: Proof of Proposition 5
Proof. a): Let us denote the price of an IP protected good that is sold to all except to
those households belonging to the poorest i− 1 income groups by pi and the resulting
profits by pii. Then, pii = (pi − b)
(
1−∑i−1s=1 βs) if 2 ≤ i ≤ k, while profits of a firm
selling to all income groups (i = 1) are given by pi1 = p1 − b. As goods are symmetric,
profits derived from each non-expired IPR must be the same in equilibrium, i.e., pii = pi
must hold. This “equal profit condition” allows the expression of all prices pi as a
positive function of pk, the price charged by firms that sell exclusively to the richest
income group:
pi = b+
(pk − b)
(
1−∑k−1s=1 βs)
1−∑i−1s=1 βs (22)
Prices increase in i and are therefore larger for goods that are sold to fewer income
groups. Moreover, all prices depend positively on pk and do not directly depend on
income differences between groups, but only on population shares.
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Along a BGP, the intertemporal budget constraints of households belonging to in-
come group i are given by:
BC(i = 1): l1 + (r − g) V (t)N(t) = bm+ p1 (c1 −m)
BC(i = 2): l2 + (r − g) V (t)N(t) = bm+ p1 (c1 −m) + p2 (c2 − c1)
BC(general): li = li−1 + pi (ci − ci−1), for 2 ≤ i ≤ k
BC(i = k): lk = lk−1 + pk (1− ck−1)
The simplification in the third line is obtained by substituting the budget constraint
of group i−1 and that in the fourth line by substituting ck = Ck(t)N(t) = 1. From the fourth
line, we obtain pk =
lk−lk−1
1−ck−1 , so that the profits of firms selling exclusively to the richest
households are given by pik =
(
lk−lk−1
1−ck−1 − b
)(
1−∑k−1i=1 βi). Due to free entry, pir+γ = F
must hold along a BGP, which, together with the familiar Euler equation r = ρ+ g (6)
gives the free entry condition(
lk−lk−1
1−ck−1 − b
)(
1−∑k−1i=1 βi)
ρ+ g + γ
= F (23)
This conditions can be plotted as an upward sloping FE curve in g - ck−1 - space (with
g on the vertical axis) which shifts up if γ is decreased (the notation γ = γ1 is used
throughout).
Rewriting the intertemporal budget constraint of group i and inserting the equal
profit condition (equation 22), with pk replaced by pk =
lk−lk−1
1−ck−1 , gives
ci = ci+1 − li+1 − li
pi+1
= ci+1 − li+1 − li
b+
(
lk−lk−1
1−ck−1 − b
)
(1−
∑k−1
s=1 βs)
(1−
∑i
s=1 βs)
(24)
This equation determines the different consumption shares ci (with 1 ≤ i ≤ k− 2) as a
function of ck−1 and of the labor endowments and population shares. As pi+1 depends
positively on ck−1, ci+1− ci = li+1−lipi+1 decreases if ck−1 increases. This implies that, for li
and βi given, all consumption shares ci depend positively on ck−1 and that a decrease
in ck−1 leads to an even larger decrease in ci (if i < k− 1). Indeed, the fall in ci caused
by the fall in ck−1 is the larger in absolute terms the smaller i is, that means the poorer
an income group is.
Taking into consideration that the total stock of labor can be either used for R&D
or for the production of final goods, the Resource constraint can be derived as:
g =
1
F
[
1− b
k∑
i=1
ciβi
]
(25)
This equation implies a negative relation between g and ck−1, as all consumption shares
ci (with 1 ≤ i ≤ k − 2) depend positively on ck−1 (due to equation 24). The resource
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constraint therefore defines a downward-sloping RC curve in g - ck−1 - space which is
independent of γ.
The BGP values of g and ck−1 are determined by equations 23 and 25), i.e. by the
intersection of the FE and the RC curve. As the FE curve shifts up when γ declines
and as the RC curve is independent of γ, a decrease in γ therefore increases g and
reduces ck−1. Due to equation 24, this decrease in ck−1 implies a decrease in all other
consumption shares ci that is greater in absolute value the poorer a group is (the lower
i is). A BGP along which m < c1 holds exists if γ is sufficiently small (remember that
m = γ
g+γ
as in equation 8), i.e. if T is sufficiently large.
b) As the state variables m and V do not enter into equations 23, 24 and 25, there
are no transitional dynamics and pi, ci, and g immediately jump to their new BGP
values56. Given that Vi = V , an unexpected change in the length of IP protection on
previously issued IPRs (i.e. a change in γ0) which affects the value of initial wealth
Vi = V affects all households symmetrically. As such a change does not affect the
absolute expenditure differences between income groups (which are given by li− li−1, as
can be inferred form the intertemporal budget constraints) and therefore does not affect
prices pi and profits, it has no impact on the free entry condition (equation 23). As
the resource constraint (equation 25) does not depend on γ0 either, g and ci therefore
only depend on the hazard rate γ1 = γ with which newly issued IPRs expire and not
on γ0. This is a generalization of the result that was formally derived in the case of two
income groups where Vi = V holds if X = 0 (see Proposition 2).
c) Intertemporal utilities along the BGP are given by
Ui(τ) =
∞ˆ
t=τ
ln (ciN(t)) e
−ρ(t−τ)dt =
ln (N(τ))
ρ
+
ln (ci)
ρ
+
g
ρ2
As there are no transitional dynamics for the variables ci and g, a household in income
group i therefore benefits from an (unexpected) reduction in the length of IP protection
(i.e. an increase γ) if ∂Ui
∂γ
= 1
ρ
[
1
ci
∂ci
∂γ
+ 1
ρ
∂g
∂γ
]
> 0 and benefits from an increase in IP
protection if ∂Ui
∂γ
< 0. ∂Ui
∂γ
> 0 holds if 1
ci
∂ci
∂γ
> −1
ρ
∂g
∂γ
> 0, which is more likely satisfied
the smaller i and the poorer an income group is, as ci increases in i and as ∂ci∂γ (> 0)
decreases in i (see above)57. As ck = 1 and ∂ck∂γ = 0,
∂Uk
∂γ
< 0 always holds, so that
56For such an instantaneous transition to be feasible, the budget constraint of the poorest income
group (BC(i = 1)) which contains the state variables V and m must be satisfied during the whole
transition phase. This is not verified here and would require an analysis similar to the one undertaken
in the case of two income groups (see the proof of Proposition 2).
57Even if the consumption shares ci of all income groups were reduced by the same absolute amount
if γ increased (i.e. if ∂ci∂γ was independent of i), poorer households would still be more likely to suffer
from such a policy change. The reason for this is that intertemporal utility is concave in current
consumption so that richer households are willing to reduce their consumption by a larger absolute
amount than poorer households in order to obtain a certain increase in the rate of growth.
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households in the richest income group always prefer infinite IP protection, i.e. γ∗k = 0.
Suppose that there is a value γ∗n > 0 (or T ∗n <∞) for which the utility of an income
group n (with 1 < n < k) is maximal and for which a BGP with c1 > m exists. Then,
∂Un
∂γ
(γ = γ∗n) = 0 must hold as Ui is continuous and differentiable in γ along such a
BGP. As ∂Ui
∂γ
decreases in i, poorer households (i < n) then benefit from a marginal
increase in γ above the level γ∗n (as
∂Ui
∂γ
(γ = γ∗n) > 0 for i < n), while richer households
(i > n) benefit from a marginal reduction in γ below the level γ∗n (as
∂Ui
∂γ
(γ = γ∗n) < 0
for i > n).
In order to avoid messy calculations, it is not shown here that ∂
2Ui(γ)
∂γ2
< 0 globally
holds. Therefore, it is unclear whether there might in fact be several local maxima for
which ∂Ui
∂γ
= 0 holds. Given that γ∗n is the global maximum for group n (out of several
local maxima) this, however, does not imply that households with i < n might actually
benefit from a non-marginal reduction in γ below the level γ∗n. The reason for this is
the following: as ∂Ui
∂γ
decreases in i, we can write Un = Ui + fin(γ) with fin(γ) > 0 if
i < n and ∂fin(γ)
∂γ
< 0. Given that Un is maximal for the value γ∗n, Ui = Un − fin(γ)
can therefore not be maximal for a value γ˜ < γ∗n (which might be a local maximum) as
fin(γ˜) > fin(γ
∗
n). A symmetric argument can be used to show that it is also not possible
for households with i > n to benefit from a non-marginal increase in γ above the level
γ∗n. Therefore, an income group i < n prefers a shorter duration of IP protection than
group j (i.e. T ∗i < T ∗n and γ∗i > γ∗n), and an income group i > n prefers a longer
duration of IP protection than group n (i.e. T ∗i > T ∗n and γ∗i < γ∗n).
The analysis conducted so far was based on the assumption that an interior solution
γ∗n > 0 (i.e. T ∗n < ∞) which is compatible with the existence of an equilibrium exists.
There is indeed a non-empty range of parameters for which such a solution exists: As
has been shown in Proposition 4b, there are conditions under which an interior solution
exists in the case of two income groups, R and P . Suppose now that more income
groups i are added and that the per capita incomes of these groups lie below that
of group R and that their population shares βi are very small. This does not affect
equations 25 and 23 (the latter defining g as a function of cP ) in a discontinuous way,
so that cP and g do not change discontinuously. Therefore, an interior solution γ∗P > 0
(i.e. T ∗n < ∞) exists if parameters lie in the range derived in the proof of Proposition
4b and if the additional groups i are only endowed with a small fraction of the total
labor endowment. Then, γ∗i > γ∗P (T ∗i < T ∗P ) holds if group i is poorer than group P
and γ∗i < γ∗P (T ∗i > T ∗P ) if group i is richer than group P .
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Graphs
Figure 1: Market demand of a monopolistic firm
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Figure 3: The general equilibrium
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Figure 5: Price structure and consumption in Regime C1
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Figure 6: Price structure and consumption in Regime C2
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Figure 7: Price structure and consumption in Regime C3
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Appendix B (online)
B1: Selected “innovative” goods
In the following, the list of goods from the CEX interview survey (INTR) which are
classified as “innovative” is provided. The universal classification codes (UCC) are
added in brackets. In cases where two or more UCCs are grouped together58, the group
is counted as one innovative good which is assumed to be consumed by each household
that consumes at least one of the UCC items within the group:
Computers, computer systems, and related hardware for non-business use (690111);
computer information services (690114); internet services away from home (690116);
portable memory (690117); digital book readers (690118); computer software (690119);
computer accessories (690120); applications, games, and ringtones for devices (310400);
calculators (690220); watches (UCC: 430110); electric personal care appliances (640420);
photographic equipment (610230);
Telephones and accessories (320232); telephone answering devices (690210); voice
over IP service (270105); televisions (310130; 310140); VCR, video disc player, video
camera, and camcorder (310210); Video cassettes, tapes, and discs (310220); rental
of video cassettes, tapes, and discs (620912); video game software (310231); rental of
video software (620918); video game hardware/ accessories (310232); rental of video
hardware/ accessories (620917); online entertainment and games (620930); streaming
or downloaded video files (310240);
Radios (310311); digital audio players (310314); sound components, component sys-
tems, and compact disc sound systems (310320); accessories and other sound equip-
ment including phonographs (310333); records, CDs, audio tapes (310340); stream-
ing or downloaded audio files (310350); cable, satellite, or community antenna service
(270310); satellite radio service (270311); satellite dishes (310334);
New cars (450110); new trucks (450210); new motorcycles (450220); purchase of
motor home (600141); purchase of other vehicle (600142); aircraft (450900); vehicle
products and services (480212); vehicle parts, equipment, and accessories (480213);
vehicle audio equipment (480214); vehicle video equipment (480215); global positioning
services (520560); airline fares (530110).
Built-in dishwasher, garbage disposal, or range hood (220612); supplies for electrical
work, heating or air conditioning (240321; 240322; 240323); refrigerator or home freezer
(300111; 300112); clothes washer (300211; 300212); clothes dryer (300221; 300222);
stoves, ovens (300311; 300312); microwave (300321; 300322); dishwasher (300331; 300332);
58This is mainly done when there are different UCCs depending on whether a good (e.g. a fridge) is
purchased by a homeowner or a renter.
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window air conditioner (300411; 300412); power tools (320420); electric floor clean-
ing equipment (320511); sewing machines (320512); small electric kitchen appliances
(320521); portable heating and cooling equipment (320522); other household appliances
(690244; 690245).
B2: First best
The objective function of a social planner who maximizes the weighted sum of intertem-
poral utilities (Ui(τ) =
∞ˆ
t=τ
ln (Ci(t)) e
−ρ(t−τ)dt) and discriminates between rich and poor
households is given by
W (τ) = α(1− β)UR(τ) + (1− α)βUP (τ)
with α and 1−α denoting the welfare weights for a rich and a poor household (α > 1
2
).
The planner has to take the following resource constraint into account:
•
N(t) =
N(t)
F
[
1− bβCP (t)
N(t)
− b(1− β)CR(t)
N(t)
]
To solve the problem, we can write the Hamiltonian:
H(t) = e−ρ(t−τ) [α(1− β) ln (CR(t)) + (1− α)β ln (CP (t))] + µ(t)
[ •
N(t)
]
Suppose first that Ci(t) < N(t) holds (interior solutions). Then, the first order con-
ditions ∂H(t)
∂Ci(t)
= 0 give: CR(t) = αFe
−ρ(t−τ)
bµ(t)
and CP (t) = (1−α)Fe
−ρ(t−τ)
bµ(t)
(the second order
conditions are satisfied in all cases). Inserting these expressions into the resource con-
straint gives
•
N(t) = N(t)
F
− e−ρ(t−τ) (α+β−2αβ)
µ(t)
and inserting them into the Hamiltonian,
deriving with respect to N(t) and setting the derivative equal to − •µ gives the second
differential equation •µ = − µ
F
. The two differential equations are solved by the func-
tions: µ(t) = α+β−2αβ
ρN(τ)
e−
1
F
(t−τ) and N(t) = N(τ)e(
1
F
−ρ)(t−τ). These functions are the
optimal trajectories as the maximized Hamiltonian with µ(t) = α+β−2αβ
ρN(τ)
e−
1
F
(t−τ) =
α+β−2αβ
ρN(t)
e−ρ(t−τ) inserted is concave in N(t) and as lim
t→∞
N(t)µ(t) = 0, so that the
transversality condition is satisfied. We can therefore derive the optimal consump-
tion paths as: C∗R(t) =
αFρN(τ)e(
1
F
−ρ)(t−τ)
b(α+β−2αβ) and C
∗
P (t) =
(1−α)FρN(τ)e(
1
F
−ρ)(t−τ)
b(α+β−2αβ) . These
interior solutions result if C
∗
R(t)
N(t)
= αFρ
b(α+β−2αβ) < 1 and if g
∗ = 1
F
− ρ > 0 (note that g∗ is
independent of α in this case).
The more interesting and relevant59 case of a corner solution C∗R(t) = N(t) > N∗P (t)
59The result that an interior solution CP (t) < CR(t) < N(t) where not all invented goods are
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results if αFρ
b(α+β−2αβ) ≥ 1 > (1−α)Fρb(α+β−2αβ) . Then, the optimal consumption paths are
N∗R(t) = N(t) = N(τ)e
( 1−(1−β)bF −
β(1−α)ρ
α+β−2αβ )(t−τ)
and
N∗P (t) =
(1− α)Fρ
b(α + β − 2αβ)N(τ)e
( 1−(1−β)bF −
β(1−α)ρ
α+β−2αβ )(t−τ)
and the optimal rate of growth g∗ = 1−(1−β)b
F
− β(1−α)ρ
α+β−2αβ increases in α.
B3: Appropriating R&D spillovers through extended
IP protection
It is now assumed that IPRs grant forward protection, allowing previous innovators to
charge licensing fees from future innovators who build on the knowledge they created.
For simplicity, the case of infinite IP protection against imitation (γ = 0) is considered.
As all previously invented goods are symmetric, each holder of an IPR that was granted
in the past obtains the same licensing payment from an innovator who enters the market.
Let us assume that an innovator is required to pay total licensing fees equal to Q
upon entry. As the mass of innovators in period t is given by N(t)g, each of the N(t)
holders of previously granted IPRs receives licensing income equal to gQ in any period
t. As per period profits pi from the sale of a good are constant along a BGP, the value
of an innovation is given by V = pi
r
+ gQ
r
− Q. Inserting r = ρ + g > g (equation 6),
one clearly sees that V decreases in Q. Given that Q < pi
ρ
, the free-entry curve (that is
defined by the equation V = pi
r
+ gQ
r
− Q = F ) is upward-sloping in g-n- space (note
that pi depends positively on n) and moves to the right if Q increases, so that g declines
in the size of the licensing fee Q.
The reason why an increase in Q decreases the rate of growth is that it makes profits
for innovators more backloaded60. Therefore, Q would need to rise faster than the rate
of interest in order to increase innovation incentives. But this is not possible in the long
run as licensing payments have to be paid out of total profits which grow at a rate that
is lower than the rate of interest.
immediately produced can be optimal is driven by the technical assumption that an increase in N(t)
increases labor productivity in all sectors. Such a situation can, however, not occur in a market
equilibrium with positive growth.
60This analysis is related to O’ Donoghue and Zweimüller (2004) who identify a similar backloading
effect of forward patent protection in a quality-ladder growth model. In a setup similar to a product
variety model, Llanes and Trento (2012) find that it would indeed be optimal to pay innovators a
subsidy when they innovate, and to tax them when subsequent innovations are introduced.
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B4: Finite length of IP protection and varying enforce-
ment probability
So far, it was assumed that IP protection expires at a constant stochastic rate. Suppose
now that IPRs instead expire after Tˆ periods (finite patent length). Then, the value of
an innovation along a BGP is given by Z(t) =
t+Tˆˆ
s=t
pie−r(s−t)ds =
pi(1−e−rTˆ )
r
.
Considering Regime A in which pi = (1− β) (pR − b), inserting equations 13 and 6
(which remain unchanged) and setting Z(t) = F gives the new free entry condition
(1− β)
(
1−ϑ
1−β+ρX
1−cP − b
)(
1− e−(ρ+g)Tˆ
)
ρ+ g
= F
This condition again gives a positive relation between g and cP and between g and
Tˆ 61. As the resource constraint is unchanged, the qualitative effects of increasing Tˆ
are therefore the same as those of increasing T (i.e. of reducing γ) when BGPs are
compared. Moreover, the effects of inequality on growth and the welfare effects remain
unchanged. As the analysis of transitional dynamics is more involved if IPRs are of
finite duration than in the case of stochastic IP expiration (see footnote 7 for references)
is not carried out here.
If IPRs are infinitely lived, but only enforced with probability ∆ at the time of
invention (this is how Bernal Uribe (2012) parametrizes the strength of IP protection),
the free entry condition can be derived as
(1− β)
(
1−ϑ
1−β+ρX
1−cP − b
)
∆
ρ+ g
= F
This again gives a positive relation between the strength of IP protection, ∆, and g.
Also with this parametrization of the strength of IP protection, the qualitative results
stay the same when BGPs are compared.
61sign
(
∂Z
∂g
)
= sign
∂( 1−e−rTˆr )
∂g
 = sign [e−rTˆ (1 + rTˆ )− 1] < 0. The inequality holds as
e−rTˆ (1 + rTˆ ) < 1 for rTˆ > 0.
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B5: Hierarchical preferences
In Föllmi and Zweimüller (2006), instantaneous utility is given by u(t) =
∞ˆ
j=0
j−θc(j, t)dj
with θ ∈ [0, 1). When θ > 0, preferences are hierarchical and households attach a lower
weight j−θ (i.e. a lower consumption priority) to goods with a higher index j. In a
previous version of this paper62, I analyzed the effects of IP protection of finite duration
Tˆ within this setup, simply comparing BGPs and assuming that VR = VP (i.e. X = 0)
holds:
Given that θ is sufficiently small (“flat” hierarchy) there is again a regime in which
M < CP < CR = N holds and in which the qualitative effects that changes in Tˆ (and in
inequality) have on growth and welfare are the same as those that they have in Regime
A when goods are symmetric (θ = 0). When θ is sufficiently large (“steep hierarchy”)
an additional regime can arise in which M < CP < CR < N holds and in which there
might be multiple equilibria (like in Föllmi and Zweimüller, 2006). Given that the
economy is in the stable high-growth equilibrium, an increase in Tˆ is associated with
an increase in g and with a reduction in CP and CR, with the former reduction being
larger (in absolute terms) than the latter. Consequently, rich households still prefer a
larger value of Tˆ (when BGPs are compared)63.
B6: The effect of inequality on growth
Suppose that labor endowments (or wage incomes, that are equal to liN (t)) are re-
distributed from poor to rich households in such a way that the difference ln+1 − ln
increases for income group n < k − 1 and does not change for any other group i 6= n64.
This does not affect the free entry condition 23 as lk− lk−1 is constant, but it shifts the
resource constraint curve (equation 25) outward. The latter can be seen from equation
24: ci = ci+1− li+1−lipi+1 which indicates that - for ck−1 given - resources are freed for R&D
and growth as the consumption shares ci of groups with index i ≤ n are reduced while
62The title of this version was “Do poorer people like shorter patents?”, see https://gremaq.univ-
tlse1.fr/seminaires/kiedaisch.pdf
63With hierarchical preferences, a household´s willingness to pay zi falls in the index j, implying that
also per period profits are lower for IP protected goods with a higher index j (i.e. for more luxurious
goods). Consequently, innovators always invent the goods with the lowest index j among the not yet
invented goods. When IPRs expire after Tˆ periods, the goods on which IP protection has expired
are consequently the most valuable ones (i.e. basic need goods with a low value of j) and both rich
and poor households prefer to consume these goods first. When IPRs instead expire stochastically at
rate γ, there can be luxurious goods on which IPRs have expired and poor households might prefer to
purchase IP protected basic need goods instead of these goods. Consequently, rich and poor households
might not purchase the same variety of non-IP protected goods and the effects of reducing γ (i.e. of
increasing T ) might not coincide with those of increasing Tˆ .
64This implies that the incomes of groups with index i ≤ n (> n) all decrease (increase) by the same
absolute amount.
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those of groups with index i > n do not change. Therefore, such a redistribution from
poor to rich households increases the rate of growth g and increases ck−1. If lk− lk−1
increases but all other li+1− li are unchanged, the FE curve shifts up in g - ck−1 - space
while the RC curve is unchanged so that g increases and the consumption shares of all
but the richest group k decrease. Generalizing the argument, we obtain:
Proposition 6. Suppose that Vi(τ) = V (τ) and that there is a BGP in which c1 > m
holds. If income is redistributed in such a way that ln+1 − ln increases for some i = n
and does not decrease for any other i 6= n, the BGP growth rate g increases. If li+1− li
increases for i = n but does not change for any other i 6= n, g increases and the
consumption shares ci of all groups i ≤ n decrease while the consumption shares of the
richer groups n < i < k increase (ck = 1 always holds).
The intuition for this result is the following: if, for given prices, income is redis-
tributed from a poor to a rich household, the consumption share ci of the poor house-
hold decreases more than that of the rich increases, as the rich household needs to pay
higher prices for additional goods than the poor one does. Therefore, profits and the
incentives to innovate increase (or, put differently: less labor in the production sector
is needed which can now be used in the R&D sector).
Given that the consumption share of a poor household has been reduced due to
such an increase in inequality, this household now prefers a weaker level of IP protection
than before, as increasing g by increasing IP protection becomes more costly in terms of
current consumption if ci is lower (because intertemporal utility is linear in g but concave
in ci; see the proof of Proposition 5c). If the median voter decides about the strength
of IP protection (and no transfer payments are used), an increase in inequality that
reduces the consumption share cm of the median voter will therefore be accompanied
by a reduction in the strength of IP protection.
B7: Restricted monopoly power
In all regimes, the parametrization VR(t) = VP (t) + XN(t) and the notation cR = CRN
is used.
Regime C1
In Regime C1), rich households consume some traditionally produced goods at price
Ω, so that their willingness to pay is given by zR(t) = Ω. As CP (t) < N(t) and
as poor households prefer to consume the cheaper goods on which IP protection has
expired, they do not consume the whole variety of IP protected goods in this regime.
The IP protected goods that are exclusively sold to rich households are sold at the
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price pR(t) = zR(t) = Ω. In the following, only the case is considered in which poor
households consume some but not all of the IP protected goods (meaning that M(t) <
CP (t) < N(t)). Symmetry in profits then requires that IP holding firms that sell to
both income groups charge the price
pP (t) = zp(t) = βb+ (1− β)Ω (26)
Proposition 7. a) Along the BGP, cP = 1bβ+Ω(1−β) [ϑ+ F (ρ+ γ)− (1− β)Xρ],
g = (1−β)(Ω−b)
F
− ρ − γ and cR = 1bβ+Ω(1−β) [ϑ+ F (ρ+ γ)− (1− β)Xρ] + 1−ϑ(1−β)Ω + XρΩ .
The BGP exists if parameters are such that g > 0, m = γ
g+γ
< cP < 1, cR > 1 and
X < X˜ = (1−m)F
1−β hold.
b) g, cP and cR immediately jump to their new BGP values when there is a change
in γ = γ1 = γ0 or in another exogenous parameter (including X).
c) While rich households always prefer infinite IP protection (γ∗R = 0), poor house-
holds prefer finite IP protection if (1− β)Xρ − ϑ > 0 (i.e. if inequality is sufficiently
large) and infinite protection if (1− β)Xρ−ϑ < 0. Given that the value of T ≡ 1
γ
poor
households prefer is finite and compatible with the existence of a BGP in Regime C1, it
is given by T ∗P =
F
(1−β)Xρ−ϑ .
Proof. a) The demand for production labor is given by
LD(t) =
CP (t)ˆ
j=0
(
b
N(t)
)
1dj +
N(t)ˆ
j=CP (t)
(
b
N(t)
)
(1− β) dj +
CR(t)ˆ
j=N(t)
(
Ω
N(t)
)
(1− β) dj = bβcP +
b (1− β) + Ω (cR − 1) (1− β)
The resource constraint can therefore be derived as
g(t) =
1
F
[1− bβcP − b (1− β)− Ω(1− β) (cR − 1)] (27)
Along a BGP, the intertemporal budget constraint of a poor household is given by
N(τ)ϑ
r − g + VP (τ) =
N(τ)
r − g [mb+ [bβ + Ω (1− β)] (cP −m)] (28)
and that of a rich household by
N(τ)1−βϑ
1−β
r − g + VP (τ) +XN(τ) =
N(τ)
r − g [mb+ [bβ + Ω (1− β)] (cP −m) + Ω (cR − cP )]
(29)
Along a BGP, the free entry condition is given by Z = (1−β)(Ω−b)
r+γ
= F . Inserting
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equation 6 (r = ρ+ g), this condition pins down the BGP growth rate as
g =
(1− β) (Ω− b)
F
− ρ− γ (30)
Combining equations 30, 27, 28 and 29 allows the derivation of the BGP values of cP
and cR. X < X˜ ≡ (1−m)F1−β > 0 again needs to hold in order to ensure that VP (t) > 0.
b) In order to show that g, cP , and cR immediately jump to their new BGP values it
needs to be checked that along the transition path (where V and M adjust sluggishly)
the intertemporal budget constraint of a poor household is satisfied if g, cP and cR
adjust immediately and if X is constant. The budget constraint is given by
N (τ)ϑ
r − g +VP (τ) =
N (τ) cP (bβ + Ω (1− β))
r − g +
ˆ ∞
t=τ
[M(t) (b− bβ − Ω (1− β))] e−r(t−τ)dt
Inserting equations 6 and 30, and equation 18 and VP (τ) = N(τ) [(1−mo)F − (1− β)X]
from the proof of Proposition 2, it can be shown that this equation is indeed satisfied.
The intertemporal budget constraint of a rich household automatically holds as cR and
cP are constant during the transition.
c) Intertemporal utility of a household in group i is given by Ui(τ) = lnN(τ)ρ +
lnci
ρ
+ g
ρ2
.
Inserting the BGP values for cP , cR and g, it can be shown that UP and UR are
concave in γ. ∂UP (τ)
∂γ
∣∣∣
γ=0
> 0 holds if (1− β)Xρ − ϑ > 0 and UP (τ) is maximal if
γ = max
{
(1−β)Xρ−ϑ
F
; 0
}
. Given that (1−β)Xρ−ϑ
F
is positive and that this value of γ is
compatible with a BGP in Regime C1, T ∗P =
1
γ∗P
= F
(1−β)Xρ−ϑ is therefore the length of
IP protection preferred by poor households.
As sign ∂UR(τ)
∂γ
∣∣∣
γ=0
= sign [− [1− ϑ+ (1− β)Xρ] bβ − (1− β) Ω] < 0, rich households
prefer infinite IP protection.
In this regime, an increase in inequality resulting from an increase in β reduces the
rate of growth (by reducing the number of rich households that buy IP protected goods
at price Ω and by reducing pP (t) = zp(t) = βb + (1 − β)Ω), while, unlike in Regimes
A and B, g does not depend on ϑ and X as these parameters only affect consumption
shares ci but not prices.
Length vs breadth of IP protection
Proposition 8. Rich households prefer long (high T and low γ) and narrow (low p¯)
IPRs while poor households prefer short (low T and high γ) and broad (high p) IPRs
in order to provide innovation incentives that lead to a given rate of growth. When IP
policy is symmetrically changed for new and previously issued IPRs (γ = γ1 = γ0 and
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p¯ = p¯1 = p¯o), cP and cR immediately jump to their new BGP values, while X stays
constant.
Proof. Replacing Ω by c in the intertemporal budget constraint of poor households
allows to derive their consumption share as cP = 1bβ+p¯(1−β) [ϑ+ F (ρ+ γ)− (1− β)Xρ].
Replacing Ω by c in the free entry condition gives the following positive relation between
γ and p¯ when the rate of growth is fixed at the level g = g¯: γ = (1−β)(p−b)
F
− ρ − g¯.
Inserting this into the expression for cP and deriving with respect to p¯, we obtain
sign
∂cP
∂p¯
∣∣∣∣
g=g¯
= sign {b− ϑ+ (1− β)Xρ+ F g¯} > 0
The inequality has to hold for cP < 1. Consequently, poor households prefer obtaining
a given rate of growth through broad (high p¯) and short (high γ and low T ) IPRs, as
they lead to a larger consumption share cP . For rich households, the opposite holds
as, due to the resource constraint, cR has to fall when cP rises and when g = g¯ is held
constant. When γ and p¯ are adjusted at point in time t = τ (for new and previously
issued IPRs) and constant thereafter, there are again no transition dynamics for cP and
cR, as the value of initial wealth stays unchanged in t = τ and as the intertemporal
budget constraints are satisfied during the transition period as shown in the proof of
Proposition 7 (with Ω replaced by p¯ at the appropriate places).
The same reasoning can be applied to a static model of monopolistic competition
in which the variety of goods is exogenously given. Keeping total monopoly profits
and their distribution constant, poor households then prefer an antitrust policy that is
very strict in some sectors (i.e. marginal cost pricing) but lax in others (unconstrained
monopoly power) relative to one that increases competition (and reduces prices) a little
bit in many sectors and that rich households prefer.
In a previous version of the paper (Kiedaisch, 2009) in which instantaneous utility
is given by
ui (xi(t), ci (j, t)) = xi(t)
ν
∞ˆ
j=0
ci (j, t) dj
with ν > 0 and xi(t) denoting the consumption of non-innovative goods, it is shown
(assuming that X = 0) that long and narrow IPRs are efficient in the regime where
M(t) < CP (t) < CR(t) = N(t) . This means that for a given rate of growth, both groups
can benefit if γ is reduced to zero (infinite IP protection) and if at the same time p¯
is reduced and if rich households compensate poor households with transfer payments.
The reason for this is that long and narrow IPRs reduce markups and the consumption
of the non-innovative goods which is inefficiently high when IP protected goods are sold
at a markup. This argument is similar to that of Gilbert and Shapiro (1990) who show
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(in a partial equilibrium model) that it is optimal to have an infinite patent life but
a narrow patent breadth (scope) to minimize the deadweight losses associated with a
given strength of R&D incentives.
Regime C2
In Regime C2, poor households consume all goods that are produced with innovative
technologies (CP (t) = N(t), i.e. cP = 1) and the prices of these goods are endoge-
nous and given by pL(t) = zL(t) < Ω. Rich households in addition purchase some
traditionally produced goods at price Ω, so that zR(t) = Ω.
Proposition 9. a) A BGP in Regime C2 exists if ϑ− b− ρ (1− β)X > 0, F (ρ+ γ) +
ϑ − ρ (1− β)X < Ω < F (ρ+γ)+ϑ−bβ
(1−β) − ρX and if X < X˜ > 0. Along a BGP, g =
1
F
(ϑ− b− ρ (1− β)X) and cR = 1 + 1−ϑ+ρ(1−β)X(1−β)Ω .
b) Suppose that the economy is on a BGP and that at date t = t0 there is an
unexpected change in the strength of IP protection as described in Proposition 2. Then,
g and cR immediately jump to their new BGP values and X jumps from its previous
BGP value Xo to X1 = ρ+g+γ1ρ+g+γ0Xo in t0 (with g indicating the new BGP value). If there
is an unexpected change in one of the other exogenous parameters (including Xo), g and
cR immediately jump to their new BGP values and X remains constant after t0 (and
only changes in t0 if there is an exogenous change in X0).
Proof. a) The demand for production labor is given by
LD(t) =
N(t)ˆ
j=0
(
b
N(t)
)
1dj +
CR(t)ˆ
j=N(t)
(
Ω
N(t)
)
(1− β) dj = b+ (cR − 1) (1− β)
The resource constraint can therefore be derived as
g(t) =
1
F
[1− b− (1− β)Ω (cR − 1)]
Along a BGP, the intertemporal budget constraint of a poor household is given by
N(τ)ϑ
r − g + VP (τ) =
N(τ)
r − g [mb+ pP (1−m)] (31)
The free entry condition is given by Z = pP−b
r+γ
= F , from which we get pP =
b + F (r + γ). Inserting this equation, equations 6 and 8 and the equation VP =
N ((1−m)F − (1− β)X) (see footnote 29) into equation 31 and solving for g, we
obtain
g =
1
F
(ϑ− b− ρ (1− β)X) (32)
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Inserting this equation into the resource constraint gives cR = 1 + 1−ϑ+ρ(1−β)X(1−β)Ω .
This regime can only arise if poor households are rich enough to purchase one unit
of each good produced with an innovative technology, which is the case if ϑ − b −
ρ (1− β)X > 0. IP holding firms do not find it profitable to sell exclusively to rich
households at price pR = Ω if (Ω−b)(1−β)r+γ < F holds and firms selling to both income
groups at price pP are not constrained by the presence of the traditional technology
if pP < Ω, i.e. if b + F (r + γ) < Ω. Inserting the BGP value of r = ρ + g, both
conditions are satisfied if F (ρ+ γ) + ϑ − ρ (1− β)X < Ω < F (ρ+γ)+ϑ−bβ
(1−β) − ρX holds.
X < X˜ ≡ (1−m)F
1−β > 0 again needs to hold in order to ensure that VP (t) > 0.
b) In order to show that g and cR immediately jump to their new BGP values, it
needs to be checked that along the transition path (where V and M adjust sluggishly)
the intertemporal budget constraint of a poor household is satisfied if g, cP and cR adjust
immediately and if X jumps from X0 to X1 =
[
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g+γ0
]
X0. The budget constraint of
a poor household is given by
N (τ)ϑ
r − g + VP (τ) =
ˆ ∞
t=τ
[bM(t) + pP (N(t)−M(t))] e−r(t−τ)dt
Inserting equation 6, the (forward looking) free entry condition pP = b+F (r + γ1),
equation 18 and VP (τ) = N(τ)
[
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g+γ0
]
[(1−mo)F − (1− β)Xo] from the proof of
Proposition 2, this equation can be rewritten as
g =
1
F
(
ϑ− b− ρ (1− β)Xo
[
ρ+ g + γ1
ρ+ g + γ0
])
As this is the same equation as equation 32 (that determines the BGP value of g), with
Xo replaced by X1 =
[
ρ+g+γ1
ρ+g+γ0
]
Xo, the budget constraint of a poor household is indeed
satisfied during the transition. The intertemporal budget constraint of a rich household
automatically holds as cR is constant during the transition.
Due to a mechanism similar to that at work in Regime B, the length of IP protection
has no effect on g when γ1 = γ0 as it leaves “total demand” unaffected and merely shifts a
uniform demand across sectors and time. However, changing the length of IP protection
can affect growth through valuation effects: when γ1 < γ0 (for example because IP
protection is prolonged), the value of initial wealth falls, leading to a reduction in
inequality (as rich people hold more initial wealth) which in this regime (unlike in
Regime A) leads to an increase in g. A reduction of ϑ or an increase in X reduces g,
as it reduces poor households´ willingness to pay that drives the incentives to innovate
(as, due to the restriction in pricing power, monopolists do not find it profitable to
innovate in sectors the goods of which are only consumed by rich households).
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Regime C3
In this regime, both rich and poor households consume all goods produced with a
modern technology and also some traditionally produced goods (CR(t) > Cp(t) > N(t)).
Therefore, all IP protected goods are sold at the price p = zR = zP = Ω.
Proposition 10. a) A BGP in Regime C3 exists if Ω−b
F
− ρ− γ > 0, ϑ + F (ρ+ γ)−
ρX (1− β) > Ω and if X < X˜ > 0. Along a BGP, g = Ω−b
F
− ρ − γ, cP =
ϑ+F (ρ+γ)−ρX(1−β)
Ω
and cR =
1−βϑ
1−β +F (ρ+γ)+ρXβ
Ω
.
b) g, cP and cR immediately jump to their new BGP values when there is a change in
γ = γ1 = γ0 or in another exogenous parameter (including X). For any initial level of
γ compatible with the existence of a BGP in Regime C3, both rich and poor households
benefit from an increase in the length of IP protection T (i.e. from a reduction in γ).
Proof. a) The resource constraint is given by
g =
1
F
[1− b− (1− β) Ω (cR − 1)− βΩ (cP − 1)]
The intertemporal budget constraints of poor and a rich household are given by
N(τ)ϑ
r − g + VP (τ) =
N(τ)
r − g [mb+ (cP −m) Ω]
N(τ)1−βϑ
1−β
r − g + VP (τ) +XN(τ) =
N(τ)
r − g [mb+ (cR −m) Ω]
Combining these equations with the free entry condition Ω−b
r+γ
= F and the Euler equa-
tion r = ρ + g allows the derivation of the BGP values of g, cP and cR. X < X˜ ≡
(1−m)F
1−β > 0 again needs to hold in order to ensure that VP (t) > 0.
b) Proceeding as in the previous proofs, it can be shown that both intertemporal
budget constraints are satisfied during the transition phase if X is constant and if g, cP ,
and cR immediately jump to their new BGP values while m and V adjust sluggishly.
This again implies that there are no transitional dynamics in the variables g, cP , and
cR. As in Regime C1, a reduction in γ = γ1 = γ0 again reduces cP and cR by the same
absolute amount. As intertemporal utility (Ui(τ) = lnN(τ)ρ +
lnci
ρ
+ g
ρ2
) is concave in ci
and linear in g, rich households therefore always benefit from a reduction in γ if poor
households benefit from it, i.e. if ∂UP
∂γ
< 0 holds. The latter inequality can be shown to
hold if ϑ − ρX (1− β) + Fγ > 0, which is always satisfied if cP > 1 holds. Therefore,
both income groups always benefit from a reduction in γ in this regime.
In this regime, increasing T increases g and, as in Regime C1, reduces cP and cR by
the same absolute amount. Inequality has no effect on growth as the market size for
innovative goods is always equal to one and as prices are always given by Ω.
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Shifts between regimes
While the above sections analyzed the effects that IP policies and inequality have on
growth within a given regime, a change in IP protection (or in inequality) can also
lead to a switch between regimes: Suppose that ϑ − b − ρ (1− β)X > 0 and A ≡
(1− 1−ϑ(1−β)Ω−XρΩ )(bβ+Ω(1−β))−ϑ−Fρ+(1−β)Xρ
F
> 0 hold. The first condition implies that poor
households can always afford to purchase all goods on which IP protection has expired
(i.e. CP > M (Condition A) always holds), while the second condition implies that
Ω is sufficiently large so that the economy is in Regime A when γ = 0 (infinite IP
protection). We can then infer from Propositions 7, 9 and 10 that the economy is in
Regime A if 0 ≤ γ ≤ A, in Regime C1 if A < γ < B ≡ bβ+Ω(1−β)−ϑ−Fρ+(1−β)Xρ
F
, in
Regime C2 if B ≤ γ ≤ C ≡ Ω−Fρ−ϑ+(1−β)Xρ
F
and in Regime C3 if C < γ < Ω−b
F
− ρ.
Starting from infinite IP protection, a reduction in the length of IP protection T (i.e.
an increase in γ) leads to a shift to Regime C1, as it pushes firms that sell exclusively to
rich households to increase their prices up to the maximal level Ω. A further reduction
in T then makes it unprofitable to sell exclusively to rich households and leads to a
switch to Regime C2. If T is reduced even further, firms have to raise prices of all IP
protected goods to Ω and there is a switch to Regime C3. As the effect that inequality
has on growth is different in the different regimes, changing the length of IP protection
can therefore change the effect that inequality has on growth: While inequality is good
for growth when T is large (Regime A), its effect on growth becomes negative when T
decreases (Regimes C1 and C2) and it ceases to affect growth when T is reduced even
further (Regime C3)65
If parameters are such that the economy is initially in Regime A (e.g. Ω is large
enough and γ small enough), it can, moreover, be shown that a continuous reduction
in patent breadth p¯ also first leads to a switch to Regime C1, then to Regime C2, and
finally to Regime C3. Therefore, a reduction in patent breadth also makes it less likely
that inequality is good for growth.
65Föllmi and Zweimüller (forthcoming) study the case of a continuous income distribution in a similar
setup with infinite IP protection (γ = 0). They find that regressive transfer among consumers with
Ci < N increases growth, that a regressive transfer from a consumer with Ci < N to a consumer with
Ci > N reduces growth and that a regressive transfer among consumers with Ci > N does not affect
growth. While I have not done the calculations, I presume that the same results would apply in the
case of a finite expected length of IP protection when Ci > M holds. In addition, a regressive transfer
from a consumer with Ci < M to a consumer with M < Ci < N would (I presume) increase growth
in this case, while a regressive transfer among consumers with Ci < M or a regressive transfer from a
consumer with Ci < M to a consumer with Ci > N would not affect growth. Moreover, a (uniform)
reduction in T would (I presume) lower the critical income level for which Ci = N holds (as the firm
charging the maximal price Ω needs to sell to more income groups in order to break even) and would
increase M , making it less likely that a regressive transfer between two given income groups increases
growth. I therefore presume that this more general model would also predict that a reduction in T
makes it less likely that inequality is good for growth.
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